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ABSTRACT

This study aims at exploring the possibility of a new
concept of local curriculum.

On the basic recognition that

the New National Curriculum in Korea which is allegedly
localized is not a localized one, this study analyzes the
problems of Korean education and the New National
Curriculum, and examines the new Korean curriculum in
relation to debates on curriculum localization in the
United States and England.

The debates in the United

States and England have been proved to be centered around
the relinquishment of power of the central government to
the local educational authorities and schools.
To search for a new concept of local curriculum,
Foucault's and Lyotard's concepts of locality have been
derived from their poststructural and postmodern
philosophies.

The main thesis in the concept is that

validity of all knowledge is determined by the local
participants.

Consequently, a teacher's role in the

classroom should be defined differently from the
traditional way.

This study suggests

"deprofessionalization" as a teacher's role in localized
iv

curriculum, invoking the Foucauldian concept of selfdetachment and Lyotardian imagination and paralogy.
"Dialogue" is suggested as a more concrete practice of
deprofessionalization in the classroom.

Some arguments for

dialogue are analyzed and Bakhtinian dialogism based on
such concepts as unfinalizability, heteroglossia, death of
the author, meaning as a "historical event," intertextual
construction of meaning, etc. is suggested as helpful to
the practice of local curriculum.

v

INTRODUCTION

Despite the recent efforts to centralize the power of
curriculum decision-making by some right-wing politicians
and fundamentalist religious groups in the United States
and the English curriculum reform in 1988, localizing
curriculum seems to be the general trend along with the
gradual demise of authoritarian political systems over the
world.

Especially in Korea where authoritarian governments

have had a very centralized curriculum policy for almost 50
years, the central government has begun to relinquish
curriculum decision-making to the local educational
authorities and schools, corresponding to the recent
democratizing trend in politics.

However, this localizing

policy does not seem to be sufficient to solve the vexing
problems that Korean education has been having since 1945.
Although this localization of curriculum in policy has
produced some desirable by-products, such as the abolition
of the so-called policy-subjects which have been used to
justify the governmental system and dictatorship, the right
to choose the actual content and method of curriculum still
remains in the hands of the central government.

This study begins with a brief description of the
Korean curricular reform history to reveal the problems of
the Korean education and curriculum.

This will show why

the Korean government presented localized curriculum as a
solution to the problems of Korean education.

An analysis

of the new National Curriculum which is allegedly localized
will be provided to examine whether the new curriculum
policy can be truly called a "local" curriculum.

Debates

around the issue of centralized-decentralized curriculum in
the United States and England will be reviewed as well as
compared with the new curriculum in Korea.
A basic assumption of this study is that a mere change
in curriculum policy will not guarantee change in actual
classroom practice, e.g., to local curriculum practice.
The teacher's role is critical in realizing the idea of
local curriculum.

Regarding the teacher's role in the

classroom, Foucauldian theory of power-knowledge and
Lyotardian postmodern philosophy is helpful in clarifying
the concept of "locality."

This study tries to extract the

Foucauldian and Lyotardian concept of locality and relate
it to the concept of local curriculum.

This study will suggest dialogue as a more concrete
practice of local curriculum.

Some contemporary

educational theories about dialogue will be examined to
find if these are appropriate in the practice of the local
curriculum this study will develop.

A Bakhtinian concept

of dialogue will be suggested as a possible method of
dealing with local differences in the classroom.

CHAPTER ONE
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURRICULAR REFORMS IN KOREA

1.1. Before the Colonial Period ( -1910)
Before Japan annexed the Korean peninsula as its
colony in 1910, Korea had developed its own educational
system and curricula through almost 5,000 years of written
history.

The Koreans traditionally

prized the humanities

and regarded technicals and pragmatics as vulgar.

The

nobility learned Confucian ethics and philosophy from the
primary community schools, and the practical subjects were
for "the common people."

All the primary schools and some

secondary schools were established and managed privately,
and the rest of the secondary schools were run by the
central or provincial governments.

The central government

was responsible for higher education.

Generally speaking,

the curricula of the schools were for the state
examination; that was the only means to becoming a
government official.
Korea had been known to the Western countries as "the
land of morning-calm"

(Gregor, 1990) or "the hermit nation"

(Griffis, 1905) until the feudal dynasty decided to open

the country to foreign intercourse in the mid-19th century;
accordingly the Western missionaries - Catholic,
Presbyterian and Methodist in turn - began to land in this
apparently serene country, carrying their belief not only
in God but also in the priority of their own culture.

They

opened, with a small group of children, the modern Western
style (primary) schools as a part of their missionary work
and taught them arithmetic, reading and writing of the
Korean language as well as basic English.

The dynasty too

showed great interest in the new educational institutions
and invited some teachers (H. V. Allen, H. B. Gilmore, B.
A. Bunker) from the U.S. and established some schools in
the Western style.

They began to teach foreign languages

and practical technologies such as medicine in 1886.

Those

schools were recorded as the first modern schools in Korea
(Underwood, 1926, pp. 11-16).
The government soon provided laws and ordinances for
the new education along with other policies to reform the
whole society, and local educationists began to establish
new private schools for children of their community.
these private schools some teachers who recognized the
peril their country confronted tried to inculcate

In

nationalistic spirit in their students and especially to
bring to them an awareness of Japan's sinister intrigue to
colonize Korea.
Because of the geopolitical nature of the country,
however, Korea became the arena of the Power's competition;
and the Great Powers such as the U.S., Japan, Russia and
China did not let it take voluntary steps to modernize.
After winning the Russo-Japan war, Japan forced Korea to
conclude a protectorate treaty in 1905, by which Japan
intervened in almost all politics in Korea.

The Japanese

supervisor started to implant the Japanese educational
system and curricula into Korea and oppressed especially
the nationalistic private schools.
Even before annexation, almost half of the officers of
the central Ministry of Education were Japanese and they
regulated the whole curricula of the primary and secondary
schools.

Japanese teachers came into the country and were

placed in national and public schools.

The proportion of

class hours for the Japanese language education was the
same as or more than those for the Korean language (Ham,
1976, pp. 28-29, 33-34}.

If a private school did not

educate according to the curriculum the school could not be

authorized as a regular school.

Textbooks which had not

been published or approved by the Ministry were banned in
schools; obviously this doctrine was aimed at those books
used in private schools which promoted patriotism and the
spirit of independence.
Dissatisfied even with this treaty, Japan in 1910
replaced it with an annexation treaty making the Korean
peninsula its colony; thus, all the efforts of the Korean
government and people to modernize the education of this
country ended in vain.
1.2. The Colonial Period (1910-1945)
Korean education during this period can be summarized
as "Japanization and mobocracy."

Japanization, or

assimilation was officially expressed as "educating the
subjects loyal to the Japanese Emperor" and mobocracy as
"schools should educate aiming at making human workers
according to the condition and standards of the people"
(Ham, 1976, pp. 65-67).

In spite of the fact that Japan

was constituted of small islands, they called their land an
"inner continent," and "integration of inner land and
Korea" was the official slogan which undergirded all the
colonial policies.

However in actuality, the educational
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policy of colonial Japan was to differentiate and
discriminate the Korean from the Japanese.

Underwood

{1926) , who had been himself a missionary and educator in
Korea since the late 18th century, summarizes the policy as
follows:
The policy of the government. ..meant to all Koreans three things
against all three of which they mentally rebelled.
First,
separate and different education for Koreans in Korea and
Japanese in Korea. Second, the frank and rather bald statement
that the chief object of the education offered was the making of
loyal citizens of Japan; third, that education in Chosen (Korea)
was to be adapted to the backward conditions and low mentality
of the people (p. 192).

In other words, Korea was regarded as an object of
exploitation not of investment.
education for Koreans.

They did not permit higher

Korean students were to learn

Japanese as their mother tongue and vocational training was
inforced.

Humanities were reduced to the minimum amount in

the school curriculum.

For example, history and geography

were not taught in the primary schools.

The Japanese tried

to control and eventually close private schools, which were
more in number than national and public schools.

Regarding

private schools, the Proconsul admonished the local
governors as follows:
Among private schools, many are established and managed by
foreign missionaries though there are some established by
Koreans.
Each governor must watch if the schools observe the
laws and regulations, if the teachers perform their duties, if
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they are using textbooks published or approved by the Ministry
of Education, and if they inspire useless patriotism and the
spirit of independence by teaching some strange songs and
others. Especially, mission schools have not been intervened by
the Ministry because of diplomatic immunity.
From now on,
discipline them by emphasizing separation of religion and
education, but be cautious not to offend their feelings (Lee,
1948, pp. 180-181).

This policy of "Japanization" and "mobocracy" in education
was salient during the first decade of the colonial period.
To control private schools the Japanese revised "the
Private School Law" (1915) in addition to the general
educational laws and regulations so they could put the
private schools in double fetters {Ham, 1976, pp. 72-74;
Underwood, 1926, pp. 195-208) .

The establishment of

private schools became more complicated and difficult and
teaching the Bible was banned by law.

When a private

school wanted to replace its principal or one of its
teachers, approval from the local Governor was needed.

A

school teacher needed to have not merely a certificate but
also a great command of Japanese.
a uniform and sword while on duty.

He was required to wear
Great was the surprise

at this severe policy among the founders, and teachers of
the schools and protests soon came into bud.
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Even in the traditional informal community schools
which numbered almost 25,000 in the nation, they forced the
teaching of Japanese and the use of textbooks published or
approved by the Ministry (Underwood, 1926, p. 179) .

As a

result, the number of schools and enrolments had
continuously decreased until 1917 after the annexation (pp.
175-178).
In 1919, a nation-wide independence movement which was
influenced by "the principle of self-determination of
peoples" proposed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson,
broke out.

Although the movement ended after six months

with numerous deaths and arrests, the Japanese government
changed its colonial policy, at least outwardly, from a
military to a cultural one.

The system of Military Police

was abolished and teachers did not have to wear swords any
more.

School years for the Korean primary and secondary

students were extended to the same years as those for
Japanese students, and higher education was opened for
Koreans.
The principle of "vocational education for the Korean"
was partly abrogated, and humanities appeared in the school
subjects along with foreign languages.

They loosened the

strict qualifications for private school teachers and tried
to appease the foreign missionaries by mitigating the
absolute principle of separation of education from
religion.

The missionaries had been playing important

roles in the protest, corresponding between the leaders of
the independence movement in Korea and those of the Korean
government-in-exile in Shanghai, China and publicizing the
miserable state of the Korean people to their own
government and people after returning to their countries.
However, the change of policy was so cunning that only
three Koreans were appointed to the "committee of
education" organized of 28 members to examine educational
demands of the Korean people after the movement.

Although

Korean language was inserted into the primary and secondary
school curricula, credit hours for it were still a third or
a half of those of Japanese, and all textbooks were written
in Japanese.

Korean students still needed to learn the

Japanese language, history and geography as if those were
their own (Oh, 1964, pp. 284-286).
The major premise of colonial policy, that is,
"Japanization and mobocracy, " was not changed, so that the
new educational laws regulated that the foremost goal of
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the primary and secondary schools was "cultivating educated
workers loyal to the National(Japanese) spirit" (Ham, 1976,
pp. 120,125).

Students' strikes continually broke out and

arrests of teachers and students followed.
In 1937, Japan opened war against China, accordingly
education became a part of war organization.

The most

salient change in education was that the name of the
schools for Koreans had the same name of the schools for
Japanese and the Korean language became an elective subject
from a required one.

They prohibited Korean students from

speaking Korean in schools and forced all Koreans to change
their names to the Japanese style.

Students were told even

to watch one another lest they speak Korean.
After the air raid on Pearl Harbor, school years in
colleges were reduced so that they could draft as many
students as possible for the war.

Humanities in the

curriculum were replaced with science and technology, and
the name "school" was literally changed to "training
center."

All the students either went to the battle front,

or were utilized to provide their labor mobilizing war
materials and foods or constructing runways and trenches.
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1.3. Period of American Military Government (1945-1948)
On August 15, 1945, Japan announced unconditional
surrender to allied forces, and Korea was liberated from
the Japanese colonialism according to the Potsdam
Declaration.
one.

However, the liberation was an uncompleted

Because the allied forces did not appreciate the

Korean people's struggles for independence in and out of
the Korean peninsula, the Potsdam Declaration regulated
that Korea, different from other Western countries such as
France, would be under the trusteeship of the U.S. and
Russia.

Regardless of the Korean people's will, the

destiny of Korea was determined according to the interests
of the powerful countries in the same way that Japan had
won the tug of war over the peninsula some decades before.
After landing in the country, the U.S. military
appointed, as the administrator of education, Captain E. L.
Lockard who had been an English professor in a city college
of Chicago.

He organized the Korean Committee on

Education, composed of 10 boards whose chairs were all
Koreans.

It was the most urgent for the committee to

replace Japanese officials, provincial superintendents,
principals, and teachers with Koreans.

In the primary

schools over 40 percent of the teachers were Japanese, and
the percentage in the secondary and higher level was more
than that (Sohn, 1992, p. 248; Underwood, 1951, p. 19).
However, because it was very difficult to find qualified
people for the places after 36 years of colonial mobocracy,
they could not strictly screen those who collaborated with
the Japanese colonial government.

It was also natural that

those who had studied in the U.S. and could speak English
had great influence in selecting personnel and deciding
educational policies.

After a few months the military

government and the committee finished organizing the
Department of Education.

Apart from the Department, the

Korean Committee on Education was rearranged and expanded
to the Educational Council; it numbered about 100 members,
a few of whom were from the American military.
Although the new Ministry adopted almost without
modification the decisions made by the Council, the fact
that the military government failed to punish traitors, or
at least to exclude them from office, and that they mainly
depended upon opinions of pro-American or pro-Western
intellectuals, laid the groundwork for a series of antiAmerican movements some decades later.

The U.S. Military's

identification of itself as "occupation forces" while the
Russian Army called itself the "liberation army" did not
help the American image. These rash behaviors and
ignorance of the Korean history and culture of the
occupation commander Gen. John R. Hodge and his staff have
been frequently criticized not only by some Koreans (Sohn,
1992) but also by some American scholars (Cumings, 1981;
1983) .
The Military government reopened all schools and
prepared temporary courses of study for these schools.
They prohibited the use of textbooks written in Japanese
and regulated that Korean should be used as the
instructional language.

However, education could not be

normal because there were limited numbers of qualified
teachers and virtually no textbooks written in Korean.
Great efforts were made to teach Korean and train teachers.
They were also concerned with adult education, by which
they tried to teach the new social order and eradicate
illiteracy.

Probably at this time, the Korean people might

have publicly heard the word "democracy" for the first time
in their history.

The illiteracy rate of those over 12

years-old was then 77 percent (Committee on Compilation of
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History of Education, 1960, p. 110).

A 6-3-3-4 system,

which was modeled itself after the American educational
system was adopted as the basic structure of education.
Japanese language classes were replaced with Korean, and
English was put into the secondary school curriculum.
From September 1, 1946, the integrated subject "Social
Studies" newly appeared in the primary school curriculum,
which was an obvious influence of Deweyan Progressivism and
of the Korean Educational Commission whose members had
visited America for four months from March 1946.
Although textbooks of Korean language and Korean
history were promptly published by a few Independent
Movement groups that had maneuvered underground during the
colonial period, other classes depended mainly upon
blackboards and materials mimeographed by teachers because
of the lack of the textbooks.

The content of education

could not far exceed that of the colonial period.

In other

words, despite getting their lost identity back, e.g.,
their own names, language, and history, they could not get
rid of inertia because the Korean identity was not one they
had won for themselves but was one others had suddenly
brought to them.

At this moment the American Educational
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Mission introduced Deweyan concepts such as "experience"
and "life."

As a result, the so-called "New Education

Movement" expanded throughout the nation.

It seems to be

the case that, taking into account the historical and
cultural situation of the day, teachers and educationalists
never fully or even well understood and appreciated the
Deweyan educational theory based on democracy that
undergirded the New Education Movement.
Although some name this period as the "period of no
educational contents," paradoxically, this was the only
period when Korean teachers enjoyed their freedom and
autonomy regarding the content of education.

Teachers

could teach what they wanted because there were no
curricula coerced from the outside.
1.4, Period of Subject-Centered Curriculum (1948-1962)
On August 15, 1948, the constitution was ratified, and
Korea started its new history as a Republic, in spite of
the vehement opposition from those who did not want a solid
fixation of the partition of the country.
Even after the departure of the Republic of Korea, the
situation in education did not improve from before.
Shortage of teachers, facilities, equipment, and textbooks

confused and bewildered Korean education.

The most urgent

need was to give some guidelines to teachers who had been
just treading the colonial footsteps.

According to The Law

of Education enacted in 1949, "subjects of schools except
for colleges, colleges of education, and informal schools
shall be prescribed by a Presidential decree, and courses
of study and class hours of those by a regulation of the
Ministry"

(Korean Education Law, Article 155) .

The

Ministry of Education regulated that the government publish
all textbooks of the primary schools and textbooks of a few
policy subjects of the secondary schools such as Korean
language and literature, Korean history, and social life
and that the rest of the textbooks be examined and approved
by the government.
The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 when the
government was trying to take more specific steps to
provide textbooks to teachers and students.

During three

years of the wartime, education continued only nominally in
the temporary tents wherever there were no battles.

Even

during war time, classes of the primary and secondary
schools were mainly focusing on entrance examinations.
Entrance examinations for both middle and high schools
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existed until the 1970s.

Even today, the college entrance

examination is still most powerful, virtually dominating
the contents and methods of the primary and secondary
school curricula.
The results of the war regarding the content of
education manifested itself in the government's
scrutinization of school curriculum and its strengthening
of the ideological in education.

Anti-communism permeated

all humanities and as in the U.S. communism became an
antonym of the word "democracy."

This anti-communist

ideology and the central control system exerted great
influences on the contents and methods of education, and
consequently on teachers' autonomy thereafter.
As soon as the war ended -- technically it was
suspended, at least officially, by the armistice agreement
between the U.N. and North Korea -- the government
announced the curricula for the primary and secondary
schools in the form of a law in 1955, which was based upon
Curriculum Handbook for the School of Korea published by
the third American Educational Mission to Korea (Sohn,
1992, pp. 446-449).

This has been recorded as the first

official Korean curriculum after 1945.

In this law,
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curriculum meant the "organization of subjects and other
educational activities of schools.”
what, how much, and when to teach.

The government decided
Even for the subjects

whose textbooks were not to be published by the government,
courses of study including detailed chapters and contents
were prepared.
Teachers and curricularists of the day seem to have
accepted the General Transfer Theory or Mental (Formal)
Discipline Theory.

Except for broad-field subjects like

"Social Studies” and an introduction of extracurricular
activities (club activities) into the curriculum for one or
two hours a week in the curriculum of 1955, no evidence
could be found that the American Educational Mission that
visited Korea 10 times from 1952 to 1961 and their Deweyan
theory had influence upon classroom practices.

Subject

barriers were thought to be fixed and individual needs and
differences subjected to the pre-organized uniform
curriculum.
1.5. Period of Experience-Centered Curriculum (1962-1973)
In 1960, the authoritative President S. Lee, who had
been in power from 1948, resigned and took refuge in Hawaii
after a series of student protests against rigged

elections.

However, even before various democratic

measures of the new government were implemented, the
government was overthrown in 1961 by a military coup
d'etat.

As a result, local superintendents and officials

of education who had previously been elected by the
inhabitants' vote were now appointed by the central
government.

On the one hand, the military government

announced anti-communism as "its utmost policy," in order
to get political support from the U.S. government who had
at first been suspicious about the coup leader C. Park's
ideological background.

On the other hand, the coup

leaders pledged economic development to console the Korean
people.
In 1963, the curriculum was revised mainly to include
contents justifying the coup in Humanities textbooks.
"Anti-communism" appeared as a distinct subject in the
primary school curriculum.

At this time, the Deweyan

theory of "education as experience" was officially adopted,
and curriculum was defined as "all learning activities
which students experience under the guide of the school"
(Research Committee of Curriculum and Textbooks, 1990, p.
11).

William Kilpatrick's Project Method was introduced to

teachers, and peer group problem solving was encouraged to
meet students' individual differences.

However, curricular

decisions were still made by the central government, and
classes still focused on entrance examinations.

Teachers

were regarded as technicians who should sincerely transmit
pre-selected and organized educational contents to
students.

Peer group problem solving was often

misunderstood as solving the same problems in the same
class by group.
Apart from the official introduction of the concept of
experience-centered curriculum, the government's devotion
to economic growth brought another impact on school
curriculum.

Efficiency emerged as an important virtue in

Korean society and was used as a major excuse to amend the
Constitution and hence to justify the long-term
authoritative rule.

Variety, differences, and discussions

were rejected as inefficient.

They even instituted and

forced "students to memorize "the National Charter of
Education"

(1968), which stated that efficiency and

practicality were "to be respected."

In the political and

social situation like this, education was almost
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indoctrination and Deweyan theory had no place in
curriculum practice.
Moreover, B. S. Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational
Objectives (1956, translated into Korean in 1966) and R. F.
Mager's concept of behavioral objectives (1961, translated
into Korean in 1976) along with behavioral psychology were
introduced and enjoyed general popularity among teachers
and educators because of their efficiency-based nature.
McClelland's Achievement Motive Theory was used to justify
education for economic development, and B. Chung's
definition of education was taught in colleges as the one
and only definition: "Education is deliberate change of
human behavior"

(1970, p. 15).

Education was regarded as

the means to an end imposed externally, and nobody
seriously raised questions about this.
Thus, despite the official definition of it, actual
curriculum managed by classroom teachers was not unlike
traditional subject-centered curriculum.

Curriculum was

still regarded as the means to an end extrinsically
imposed, whether it was economic growth of the country or
the growth of students' mental ability; and teachers were
to transmit efficiently curricular knowlege to the passive

students.

Continuing vestiges of Japanese Imperialism and

a powerful hierarchical Confucian tradition could not be
excluded from the various factors influencing Korean
education and curriculum management.

There were other

reasons that experience-centered curriculum could not go
beyond the level of an empty slogan - the overall qualities
of teachers, poor facilities of schools, and objections
from parents who wanted their children to pass without
difficulty the entrance examinations to junior high, senior
high schools, and colleges.

Entrance examinations to

junior and senior high schools were finally abolished for
the "normal management of school curriculum" in 1968 and
1974 respectively.
1.6. Period of Discipline-centered Curriculum (1973-1981)
In 1972, President C. Park, who had already been in
power for a decade, declared a state of emergency amidst
incessant student protests against his tyranny and amended
the Constitution so that a provisory clause which had
regulated the Presidential term limit was eliminated.
After this second and pro-government coup d'etat, the
curriculum was revised again.

Contents justifying the coup

were newly included in such subjects as National Ethics,
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Korean History, and Social Life.

At this time curriculum

was defined as structures of the disciplines (Research
Committee of Curriculum and Textbooks, 1990, pp. 19-20).
J. Bruner's theory of the structure of knowledge
(1959) was fully accepted, and all the school subjects were
encouraged to be organized into spiral curricula.

Bruner's

structure of knowledge was thought to correspond to J.
Piaget's psychological schema.

These theories were

combined so effectively with the already renowned TylerBloom-Mager rationale that curriculum should be composed of
certain steps.
First, aims or objectives should be pre-determined.
Broad and ideal aims should have already be set by the
government, sometimes in the form of a law.

Those specific

to each subject should be decided by such specialists of
the subjects as biologists for biology with the help of
Bloom's taxonomy.
Second, the scope of the contents of each subject
should be defined to achieve efficiently those aims and
objectives.

The contents should be structures which could

represent characteristcs of each subject.
specialists would be able to do those jobs.

Again, subject

Third, the contents should be organized in a spiral
form by the specialist.

Bruner's and Piaget's theories,

such as the three stages of representation - enactive,
iconic, and symbolic - (Bruner, 1959) and the development
of schema, would be very helpful in deciding when to teach
particular concepts.

Bloom's taxonomy and Mager's

behavioral objectives would also help in this process.

If

the contents of each subject were well organized, teaching
itself would not have great significance.
Fourth, teachers should measure, rather than evaluate,
the degree of students' achievement according to the pre
specified aims and objectives.
Teachers and even curricularists had no place in the
school curriculum.

So long as they did not raise serious

questions about the contents they were teaching nor
question the official methodology, teachers were safe.
Good teachers were those who transmitted efficiently
textbook knowledge.

They did not have to research

something because a textbook was the only thing they should
be concerned about, and the content of it would remain
unchanged at least for the decade in which it was
published.

To make matters worse, the government was so
autocratic in this period that various control over the
contents of classroom teaching as well as over the press
was prominent.

Military training had already been a

required subject in senior high schools and colleges since
the late 1960s, even in girls' high schools.

The school

picnic was officially named the "Military March."

Although

national security against the bellicose communists of North
Korea was always the excuse of oppression, that was
actually a measure for staying in power by terrifying the
people.
The Korean curricular field in this period was
obviously swayed by the theories of the structure of the
discipline.

Among those theorists, R. S. Peters(1966) and

P. H. Hirst(1965) contributed not only to justifying
Bruner's theory of the structure of the discipline but also
to reconsidering what had been regarded as granted.
Similarly to Dewey, Peters and Hirst showed, using ordinary
language analysis, that the current concept of education,
and therefore curriculum as a means to an end, was wrong.
They began to denounce the theory of extrinsic values in
education which undergirded the Tyler-Bloom-Mager rationale
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and to arouse sympathy, mainly from some professors in
colleges and departments of education, for education as its
own end.
At the same time, some dissident teachers began to be
expelled from schools because of the content they had
taught in classrooms, and they formed an important antigovernment group.

They started, as a plausible reaction to

the expulsion, to study

political, especially Marxist,

theories of education, particularly those of P. Freire, M.
Carnoy, L. Althusser, M. Sarup and K. Harris.

This was

plausible because there seemed to be no better theory than
those of Marxists to explain the political {and
educational) situation in Korea and, moreover, to suggest a
solution, namely a revolution.

For a good example,

Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed {1970) had long been a
banned book but was read widely among radical teachers and
scholars, and his concept of "conscientization" became a
common word describing "teaching something antigovernmental or anti-capitalistic, therefore communist."
1.7. Period of Humanistic Curriculum (1981-1995)
Park's autocratic government, which had been in power
for almost two decades, collapsed as the chief of the

Korean C.I.A. assassinated the President on October 26,
1979.

In spite of the Korean people's bursting expectation

and demand for a freer society and for the civilian
democracy which had been restrained so far, a group of
generals who were afraid of losing their vested privilege
carried out another military coup d'etat, killing hundreds
of innocent civilians in May 1980.
As had usually been the case, the national curriculum
was revised once again in the next year after the new
government started.
to be humanistic.

This time the new curriculum claimed
One or two school hours per week were

reduced, and extracurricular activities were emphasized in
order to normalize the management of school curriculum by
relieving students from the excessive burden of preparation
for college entrance examinations.

Integrated subjects

were also introduced into the primary schools.

However,

students, especially high school students, were to stay at
school almost until midnight under the name of "autonomous
classes" or "compensatory classes," and the extracurricular
activities were never conducted outside school.

At the

same time, the government strictly banned private tutoring
which had long been a social problem because of its high
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cost and hence its availability only for the rich.

The

risk increased the cost, and secret tutoring became a
lucrative job in Korea.

As a result, the overall

expenditure of private tutoring became bigger than that of
the regular schooling (Kong and Chun, 1990).

From this

time on, colleges were forced to reflect applicants' high
school grades in their selection of the students.
The sanguinary coup in 1980, on the other hand, made
the dissident groups, especially those composed of student
activists, more violent and more biased to Marxist
theories.

Anti-Americanism began to appear openly in

students' demonstrations after this coup, which was finally
acknowledged by the U.S. government officials who had, as
before, preferred autocracy to "instability" in the Korean
peninsula.

Dissidents were no longer afraid of the

government's oppressive power, and anti-government riots
more frequently burst out.

In the same way, comparatively

young scholars and professors in academic circles did not
conceal their interests in radical social theories.

Thus,

such jargon as "neo-colonial monopoly capitalism" has been
used to define the nature of Korean society {Park and Cho,
1989) .

In the field of education, a British version of the
New Sociology of Education and the Conflict Theory from the
U.S. were introduced into Korea.

The New Sociology

stimulated the Korean educationalists' taken-for-granted
view of curriculum, while Jean Anyon's study into the
American History textbooks (1979) was often quoted to
reveal distorted ideological reflection in curriculum.
Some of Michael Apple's books were translated into Korean.
Some curricular theorists began to raise fundamental
questions about the usefulness and validity of the TylerBloom-Mager rationale (Lee, 1982) .
It was in this period that W. Pinar's reconceptualist
curriculum theory (1981) was introduced as an alternative
approach to the traditional taken-for-granted view of
curriculum (Kwak, 1981; Lee, 1983).

In his effort to

classify curricular researches imported to Korea into some
categories, Lee (1983) pointed out the looseness of the
term "reconceptualist," and he broke Pinar's
reconceptualists into two separate camps: those who had
Marxist or political backgrounds and those who showed more
humanistic interest focusing on the individual.

Pinar's

study also made some Korean curricularists reconsider the
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nature of curriculum itself,
administrative significance.

which had been only an
However, Pinar's

phenomenological and autobiographical emphases were so
unfamiliar to the Korean curricularists that many were not
illuminated as to his broader interest in reconceptualizing
the curriculum field.
Inspired by an expanding atmosphere of more freedom in
overall society on the one hand and in intellectual circles
on the other, some teachers tried to organize the Teachers'
Labor Union in the mid-1980s.

Their theoretical support

was mainly provided by the teachers who had been expelled
from their schools and who had been fascinated by the
political educational theory

since the 1970s.

parents showed an aversion to the word

Some of the

"laborer"which

seemed to identify their children's teachers with the
"vulgar" manual laborer and the government was able to
criminalize the movement.

More than 1,500 young teachers

who refused to secede from the Union were fired and formed
an important dissident group.

Although some of the initial

activists among the teachers were excessively biased toward
Marxist theories of education as a reaction to the
prohibition of Marxist theories of any kind, their on-the-

spot experience enabled them to make many practical
researches, and they began to publish a series of critiques
of the content of the textbooks and classroom knowledge
{Union of Association of Subject Teachers, 1989; Teachers
Association for Korean Language and Literature Education,
1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990; Teachers Association for Moral
and Ethics Education, 1989; Teachers Association for
History Education, 1989; English Teachers Association,
1991; Department of Subject in Teachers Union of Korea,
1990; Association of Korean Language and Literature
Teachers in Chung-Nam Province, 1988).
"Open education," which had been introduced into Korea
with A. S. Neil's Summerhill School, was also revitalized
as another possible alternative to the uniform national
curriculum.

Since it is too early to evaluate the result

of the movement which is still in an experimental stage in
about 10 schools, it would be sufficient for the present to
value the teachers' voluntariness and enthusiasm to respect
students' individual differences, creativity, and autonomy
in spite of the prevailing uniform curriculum.
The military training as a required class, which had
been a symbol of both authoritative policy of education and
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the partitioned state of the country, was abolished in this
period and will be eliminated from the high-school
curriculum in 1995.

The content justifying government

power has been removed from so-called policy subjects.
In 1993, the new President Y. Kim was inaugurated, and
a "civilian" government has been launched.

Because he is

the first President who has not been from the military
since 1961, many people look forward to a more democratic
and free society.

In 1994, most of the teachers who had

been fired because of the Union Movement returned to their
schools, giving up the Union but not its ideals.

The

future finally may be "open."
1.8. Summary and Review
One of the most noticeable features in the history of
curricular reform in Korea is that the reforms always
followed major changes in the political situation.
especially conspicuous after 1945.

This is

In other words, those

who seized the political power always needed the reform of
the national curriculum in order both to include the
content justifying the process of taking the power and to
accord the curriculum to the contemporary educational and
curricular theories that had been introduced into Korea.
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Every national curriculum since 1945 was the result of the
subtle, sometimes very odd, combination of these two
purposes, producing situations where it has not been easy
to distinguish which one of these two purposes was the
prior.
Consequently, official curriculum policy could not
help being authoritarian, and control of the central
government over planning and managing the curriculum was
almost inevitable.

There has been no room for teachers,

students, parents, and even curricular theorists, whose
roles were not neglected so completely even in the Tyler
rationale, the most influential model for the Korean
curriculum.
Thus, the Korean national curriculum has been most,
vulnerable to Marxist criticism, such as K. Harris's work,
namely that curriculum is used as a major means to present
"a distorted view of the world," and to offer "a
misrepresentation of reality" {1979, p. 164) .

This line of

political critique about education and curriculum was so
flourishing in the mid-1980s that few dared to point out
its weakness, afraid of being stigmatized as conservative.
However, as many scholars have properly indicated, these

political theories of education and curriculum have been
successful in raising

problems but have failed in offering

solutions to the problems.

Especially in Korea, the harsh

political condition has made some intellectuals biased
toward radical political theories, which posed rather than
eliminated many problems.
More than twenty years ago, a curricular theorist
symbolized the history of Korean curricula since 1945 as a
period of objectives model.

He diagnosed rote learning and

teaching as a major malignant symptom of the Korean
education and pointed out that the symptom grew from the
fact that the objectives model was widely held by teachers
and educationalists.

He proposed a content model as an

alternative (Lee, 1977); this idea was obviously inspired
by Peters, Hirst and Bruner, and was not very different
from L. Stenhouse's (1975) "process model."

Although he

suggested, leaving aside political or Marxist concerns,
that Korean teachers and educationists alter the concept of
curriculum itself, many problems still remain unsettled,
problems inherent in the objectives and content models of
curriculum.

Another distinctive feature of the Korean curriculum
through its history is that it has continuously been
influenced by foreign theories.

It was altogether

instituted by foreigners even after the foundation of the
country; since the introduction of modern education, the
Western theories especially have exerted a great impact on
the theory and practice of the Korean curriculum.

Thus,

the lack of indigenous and idiosyncratic theories and
practices of curriculum has been frequently mentioned as
one of the problems in the Korean education.

As a possible

reaction to this, some radicalists sought a way of
liberating the Korean curriculum from the Western,
particularly American influence.

It was also in the mid-

1980s that North Korean President Il-Sung Kim's version of
nationalism, "Idea of Self-Reliance," was introduced to the
young radicalist underground.

This effort, however,

sometimes showed a very chauvinistic tendency and raised
other important questions regading curriculum: Can and
should there be indigenous or nationalistic curriculum?
Can one be indigenous without being nationalistic or
chauvinistic?

On the other hand, from the curriculum revised in
1987, the government accepted the concept of local
curriculum in order to break down the uniformity which has
been pointed out as the major cause of the curricular
problems in Korea.

This concept of localization has

further developed to become the most important
characteristic of the new curriculum which will be
implemented in 1995.

Although the new policy appears to be

more democratic and very timely in this postmodern era,
this concept of localization provides grounds for its own
questions and disputes.

CHAPTER TWO
THE NEW LOCALIZED CURRICULUM {1995 -

)

At the end of 1992, the Korean government prepared a
new national curriculum, which is to be implemented in
1995.

The government alleged that it had tried to "resolve

the uniformity, rigidity, and closedness that had been
frequently pointed out as major problems of the Korean
curriculum by decentralizing the right to decide the
content of education and enlarging range of autonomous
discretion of schools and local authorities of education"
(The Ministry of Education, 1992a, p. 6).

Although there

are some other points the Ministry publicized that it had
placed emphasis on in the process of the revision, such as
education for democratic citizenship or cultivation of
creativity, these are not very different from the slogans
that appeared whenever the curriculum was revised.

Thus,

this new curriculum is called localized curriculum.
Because the most salient, and perhaps most notorious,
feature of the Korean curriculum has been an authoritative
government control over the uniform curriculum, as was
indicated in the prior chapter, the new localized
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curriculum is an attempt to solve many problems of Korean
education and curriculum, at least to solve the uniformity,
rigidity, and closedness, as the Ministry intends.
However, the new curriculum is not very promising in
solving the vexing problems of the Korean curriculum not
only because it prescribes localization as a solution
without altering the concept of curriculum itself but also
because the new curriculum is not as much localized as it
appears.
2.1. The Concept of Localization in the New Curriculum
A document published by the Ministry of Education
shows that "the decentralization of curriculum decision
making"

(1992a, 1992b) is a core point of the revision.

So, localization means officially that the central
government decentralizes the right of curriculum decision
making to local educational authorities and school units,
and ultimately to the teacher.
Under centralized curriculum policy, the central
government develops and mandates the whole curriculum.
"Desirable human nature" or "educational aims" are usually
prepared before the curriculum is developed, and curriculum
is identified with the contents which are selected and

organized in order to achieve these aims and objectives
most effectively.
an end.

Curriculum is looked upon as a means to

The teacher's role is to produce by means of

curriculum the desirable human nature out of raw material,
that is, the student.

Teachers are forced to teach

predetermined content provided to them in a document called
"curriculum" in predetermined ways.

From the viewpoint of

the superior offices, such as the Ministry and the local
educational authorities, teachers are no more than
technicians who apply the predetermined curriculum to
students.

Those teachers who reflect seriously on why,

what and how to teach become problem teachers.

Not only

curriculum but also teachers and students become means to
an end.
On the other hand, decentralized curriculum policy
attributes all the responsibilities and rights regarding
curriculum development and management to the teacher's
role.

Under this policy, teachers are no longer the

objects of supervising by the superior offices and,
extremely speaking, can teach whatever they want to.

Many

of the problems inherent in centralized curriculum policy
can be resolved {Kwak, 1989, pp. 165-166): First, the

teacher could escape from the role of mere deliverer.
Second, students' differences, local particularities, and
different educational views can be reflected in the
curriculum.

Third, such democratic characters as openness

and forebearance can be developed.

Fourth, education and

teachers will no longer be regarded as means to an end.
However, economy and efficiency that are characteristic of
centralized curriculum policy will be decreased
considerably.

In addition, because there will be no such

notion as prespecified content to be taught, the teacher
can and should decide what and how to teach by him- or
herself.

Thus, the teacher’s job-related burden will be so

heavy that there is a danger that incompetent teachers
could teach anything.
Localization in the new Korean curriculum also has
another meaning, that of "understanding of the student's
own province by curricularizing various information about
the local history, geography, economy, culture and current
events, or by using it" (Inn, 1988, p. 13).

This

geographical notion of localization is called "cultures of
learning argument" by Weiler (1993, p. 57), which argues
that localization "can provide greater sensitivity to local

variations"

(Weiler, p. 64) or "[can adapt] the educational

efforts to local conditions, both in terms of local
economic activities, and in terms of knowledge and
understanding of the special characteristics of the local
region"

(Weiler, p. 64).

This concept of localization has

already been introduced into the Korean national curriculum
since 1987, as shown at the end of the prior chapter.

In

Social Studies in the primary school, "Life of Our City and
Province" is suggested as a localized unit.

In the new

curriculum, on the other hand, an optional course hour in
the primary school and an elective subject in the secondary
school can be used as a localized unit.

The optional

course of the primary school can be used "either as a
supplementary or enrichment class of a regular subject or
as a creative educational activity class depending on the
unique educational needs of schools or the demand of
students."

In either case, "directions from local

educational authorities should be observed"
of Education, 1992a, p. 18).

(The Ministry

The elective subject of the

secondary school is one of those subjects such as Chinese
Characters, Computer, Environment, or other necessary
subjects (for the Middle School) and one among Philosophy,
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Logic, Psychology, Education, Everyday Economics, Religion,
Environmental Science, or other necessary subjects (for the
High School).

One of these other subjects can be a

localized subiect, complying with directions of local
educational authorities (p. 44).
However, considering the current situation of Korean
education, it is not probable that both primary and
secondary schools will select a localized class for the
optional course or the elective subject.

It is more

probable that the optional course of the primary school
will be used as a supplementary or compensatory class to
regular classes, which will be more easily managed than
designing an entirely new (localized) class.

For the

secondary school also, the situation will be the same
because selecting one among the given subjects as an
elective will be much easier, consequently more feasible,
than creating a whole new subject, which will necessarily
require extra research and efforts from staffs and teachers
of the school whose primary concern will be college
entrance examinations.

Moreover, despite its meaning and

validity as "a means of recognizing and accommodating the
diversity and importance of different cultural environments

in one society"

(Weiler, 1993, p. 66), the diversity and

difference do not seem to be significant enough to
influence the whole curriculum of general education in a
small and homogeneous country like Korea.

For instance,

according to research about the educational needs of the
Korean people (Chin et a l ., 1989, pp. 98-99), there is
almost no difference in the kinds of educational needs
among the people according to their place of birth and
residence.

The result may be a reflection of the Korean

people's homogeneity in ethnicity, culture and language.
Schubert (1991) admits that "if the society is rather
homogeneous, differences by locale would be diminished
considerably and curriculum goals would be centralized by
default"

(p. 105).

Although Pinar (1991) suggests,

analyzing Southerners' "presentism,"

the significance of

place or locale in curriculum, to lay the same emphasis on
the Korean curriculum, especially on curriculum for general
education seems to be almost impossible.

The impossibility

might come from the significance of the place called Korea
that has homogeneous race, culture, and language, unlike
the United States of which heterogeneity is one of the most
important characterisitcs.

Thus, by the concept of localization, the Ministry
seems to be placing emphasis on decentralization of the
right of curriculum decision-making rather than on
geographic localization of curriculum content.

The level

of decentraliztion, nevertheless, shows that the new
curriculum is not at all as decentralized as it appears.
2.2. The Level of Localization
The level of localization or decentralization of the
curriculum decision-making could be varied according to
what extent the central government relinquishes its power.
Hannaway and Carnoy (1993) distinguish decentralization
into three levels: system-level decentralization
(decentralizing decision-making from national to local
jurisdiction), organization-level decentralization
(decentralizing decision-making from central authorities to
school-level actors), and market decentralization
(decentralizing decision-making to parents)

(pp. xi-xii).

It is also possible to categorize the levels into two
(Kwak, 1989): the active level or localizing enactment of
curriculum in which local authorities and schools have the
right to decide and legislate their own curriculum, and the
passive level or localizing management of curriculum in
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which local authorities and schools restructure and manage
national curriculum in accordance with the specific
circumstances of a province and a school (p. 166).
In the new curriculum for the primary and the middle
school, the right of decision making in curriculum is not
more decentralized than in the prior curriculum.

But in

the high school curriculum, the right of designing and
implementing curriculum appears to be relinquished
considerably to local educational authorities and schools.
This change is so revolutionary that no such policy can be
seen in the prior curricular revisions since 1945.

Until

the present curriculum, the Ministry of Education has
regulated the subjects, class hours for them, and the grade
year when those subjects should be taught for all kinds of
high schools.

In the new curriculum, on the other hand,

the Ministry designates 70 units of compulsory subjects out
of 188 units that the high school student should complete
in three school years (a unit means a class hour per week
in a semester).

Local educational authorities and

individual schools decide 106 units and 12 units each.
Statistically seen, these figures might be seen as
representing a dramatic decentralization of curriculum
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decision-making, like one that corresponds to Hannaway and
Carnoy's system- or organization-level decentralization and
Kwak's active level of localization.

However, numbers,

figures, or statistics show nothing real in this case as in
other numerous cases.

The right of local educational

authorities and schools to select the content of education
is virtually blocked because the Ministry still specifies
the subjects, out of which the electives should be
selected.

The 106 units that local authorities can decide

for the academic (not vocational) high school, for example,
should be selected from 53 subjects, whose properties,
objectives, and outlined contents are specified by the
Ministry.

Instructional and evaluational emphases in every

subject are also prescribed.
Thus, the substance of decision-making that the
Ministry decentralized does not include the right to select
contents for the curriculum but only to select subjects out
of the given number of subjects.

This is not at all the

decentralization of curriculum decision-making about which
Hannaway and Carnoy are writing, but at the most, only the
passive level of localization in Kwak's word.

From the perspective of teachers who will actually
manage the curriculum, therefore, the localization or
decentralization which has been so highlighted as a new
feature of the new Korean curriculum will not have any
significance.
organizations.

It is not different from the prior
Moreover, the Ministry inherits textbook

policy of the colonial period, that is, to publish
textbooks of so-called policy subjects such as Korean
Language and Literature, Social Life, National Ethics, and
Korean History of secondary schools and all textbooks for
primary schools and to inspect and approve others.

Because

the objectives, content, and instructional and evaluational
emphases of all the subjects are prescribed in the form of
a law by the Ministry as forementioned, virtually all the
textbooks are published by the central government.

This

policy of curriculum and textbook design is applied to all
primary and secondary schools, no matter how they were
established, privately or publicly.

Under these

circumstances, teachers do not need to be concerned about
the curricular matters.

All they have to do is to conduct

their classes as they did: to deliver the prescribed
textbook knowledge in a prescribed way.

They have been
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identifying textbooks as curriculum, and this (mis-)
identification will continue until the revision of the
Article 155(1) of Education Law: "Curriculum shall be
decided by the Ministry of Education."
Mayors and governors of local cities and provinces who
have been appointed by the central government will be
elected by the inhabitants' vote in the same year the new
curriculum will be applied.

Local legislative assemblies

were already constructed a few years ago.

Habermas (1975)

has defined this decentralization of political power as a
process of compensating "legitimation crisis" and Weiler
(1993) uses Habermas's concept to explain the central
government's relinquishment of control over education.
Considering the overall trend of decentralization of the
governmental power in Korea, the new localized curriculum
seems to be an obvious means of compensatory legitimation
of the central government's authority.

But actual control

over curriculum decision-making is under command of the
central government, and the following quotation of Weiler
explains the situation: "Decentralization and community
participation are frequently just a model to which it is
fashionable to pay lip service"

(p. 64).
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2.3. Centralization vs. Localization in the United States
When speaking about curriculum policy of the western
countries, the United States is frequently exemplified as
having decentralized curriculum policy while France has a
very centralized system (Chin et al., pp. 45-66).
Considering that the Constitution of the United States does
not mention education, that the federal government does not
have other means of exercising control over state
educational systems (Spring, 1994, p. 194), and that the
country does not have a national curriculum like that of
Korea, it could be true that curriculum decision-making in
the United Staes is decentralized.

However, almost all the

materials about the United States' curriculum policy point
out the federal government's direct influence on curriculum
decision through, for example, persuasion, categorical aid,
civil rights legislation, and research funding (Spring,
1994, p. 212).

Despite the growing influence, especially

since the 1980s, on curriculum decision-making of the
federal government, it is still the state that holds the
final obligatory responsibility for education and
curriculum.

At the state level, the control of curriculum
decision-making is expressed through state constitutional
provisions, legislative acts, state board or department of
education requirements, and financial provisions.

In

general, the state designates subjects to be taught,
graduation requirements, time allotments, and special
programs and emphases.

Curriculum decisions made at the

state level control and restrict local curriculum decision
making in other areas as well.

Specific accreditation

requirements control such curriculum policies as extra
class activities, organization of classes, library and
other resources.

State examination systems, supervision

and inspection rights, accountability requirements, and
legislative investigations contribute to inhibiting local
innovation and experimentation (Spring, 1993, 1994; Klein,
1991; Doll, 1986).

Their effect is one of regulation, and

their influence on local curriculum decision-making is
"great"

(Peretz, 1981, p. 47).

Due to the political and

cultural environments of the United States, control over
curriculum hardly shows itself as a requirement for uniform
curriculum which can be found in Korea.

It sometimes takes

rather indirect and insinuating forms such as "no-pass, no-

53
drive" laws or high school graduation as a requirement for
getting off welfare, which foreign researchers of American
curriculum tend to overlook very easily in studying
curriculum control in the United States.
Thus seen, curriculum policy of the United States can
not be said to be purely decentralized.

Schubert (1991)

points out that "today curriculum is controlled at the
state level more than ever before in American history " (p.
98), and Phipo (1991) categorizes 23 states into
decentralized states in curriculum policy and 21 states
into centralized states (p. 77).

The history of American

education also shows that curriculum policy has been the
result of the agreement of the various interest groups and
that neither one of curriculum policy, centralized or
decentralized, has been the penetrating one through history
(Kliebard, 1986; Spring, 1994; Schubert, 1991).
The curriculum field did not begin as a field at all.
Unlike
educational psychology, philosophy of education and sociology of
education, the field of curriculum did not originate as an
extension or application of an extant discipline. Rather, the
field is usually said to have begun in Denver in the 1920s as a
result of administrative 'need'...This origin is very important
in understanding why the American curriculum field developed as
it did, and why it is undergoing what is now undergoing. (Pinar
and Grumet, 1981, p. 20)

The cyclical nature, or "the pendulum swing
phenomenon" in Kliebard's term (1992, p. 104), of pros and

cons of argument for centralized or decentralized
curriculum decision-making in the United States seems to be
related to the origin of curriculum itself, which can be
found in the quotation above.

As its administrative and

managerial nature in origin suggests, American curriculum
policy has been largely influenced more by the societal and
political milieu than academic theories of curriculum in
ways that propitiate collective consciousness of the
American people of the time, which Schwab would deplore as
not "practical"

(Westbury and Wilkof, 1978, Chs. 10-12) .

Thus, Elmore (1993) maintains that "debates about
centralization in American education are mainly debates
about who should have access to and influence over
decisions, not about what the content and practice of
teaching and learning should be and how to change those
things"

(p. 40), and that this is why the debates have

influenced little to the teaching practice of teachers.
Although Franklin argues that social control over
curriculum has not disappeared but "muted" (in Pinar, 1988,
p. 89) , it seems to have never been muted.

Especially

since the 1980s, this control has been so loud that legal
decisions and legislation toward centralized curriculum,
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both at the national and the state level, have been
increased continuously.

But these tendencies to centralize

curriculum decision-making do not seem always to aggravate
teachers and local authorites.

Hannaway's distinction of

"social" from "bureaucratic" processes (1993, p. 152) in
curriculum control is very suggestive in this respect.
Social control, by definition, requires interaction.
It is the
process by which individual behavior is affected by the
informational and normative influence of others, (p. 152)

If control of curriculum is a social one, teachers do not
feel unduly restricted by curriculum policies even when
they do not actually participate in curriculum decision
making .
Curriculum decision-making in the United States, thus
seen, does not seem to be controlled as bureaucratically as
the Korean curriculum, although it is not a completely
decentralized one.
2.4. Centralization vs. Decentralization in England
Another often quoted example, at least until 1988, of
a decentralized curriculum system in which teachers decide
on their curriculum was that of England.
Teachers in England are often said to be much more 'free' than
teachers in other parts of the world, particularly in their
freedom to decide what to teach.
There is no centrally imposed
curriculum for schools. (Lawton, 1978, p. 1)

England has been said to have a "national educational
system locally administered"

(Jones, 1985, p. 27).

Until

1833, there was little problem about central control of the
curriculum because the government had deliberately avoided
financial involvement (Lawton, 1980, p. 13).

Since the

second half of the 19th century, however, a conflict has
developed between those who, in general, hold the
philosophy of laissez-faire and those who want some kinds
of limited government intervention.

By the 1944 Education

Act, all regulations that limited teachers' control of the
curriculum disappeared due to the united resistance of
teachers.

The only subject the 1944 Act regulated to be

taught in schools in England was religious education
(Jones, 1985, p. 44) .

Thus, after 1945, schools were free

to embark upon any kind of curriculum the teachers chose to
offer.
Although the central government had sometimes tried to
gain some control of curriculum, the effort had not been
successful until 1988.

Good examples were failures of the

imposition of five-subject School Certificate examination
in 1950-51 (Lawton, 1980, p. 21) and of the attempt to set
up a national curriculum agency - The Curriculum Study
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Group - under the government control in 1964 (Jones, 1985,
p. 46) .

The School Certificate Examination had to give way

to the New General Certificate of Education (GCE) single
subject Ordinary Level examination, and the attempt to
construct a curriculum agency ended up with the Schools
Council being dominated not by the government but by
teacher representatives.
In 1976, Prime Minister Callaghan questioned whether
schools and the education service generally were doing
enough to provide the industrial society with sufficient
training in the basic subjects, which initiated the socalled Great-Debates afterwards (Lawton, 1980, pp. 24-25;
Jones, 1985, pp. 26-27) .

These Great Debates, obviously

the same kind as the debates in the United States after A
Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in
Education, 1983), The Closing of the American Mind (Bloom,
A., 1987), and Cultural Literacy (Hirsch, 1987), brought
forth the Education Reform Act of 1988.
According to the Act of 1988, the National Curriculum
is mandatory and statutory (Dufour, 1990) .

The ten defined

subjects, the foundation subjects -- English, Mathematics,
Science, Modern Language, History, Geography, Technology,

Music, Art and Physical Education -- occupy the majority of
the timetable, leaving some place, but not much, for
additional subjects to be chosen by schools and teachers,
in consultation with governors.

In addition, students1

attainment in National Curriculum subjects is to be tested
at 7, 11, 14 and 16 years of age.
Although this "revolutionary" reform is a result of
more broad social demands such as efficiency of education,
teacher accountability, economic competitiveness, and basic
skills as well as then Prime Minister Thatcher's
charismatic leadership {Mclean and Voskrensenskaya, 1992,
p. 75), there has been a long history of arguments for
clearer central guidelines for curriculum (Hirst, 1978;
Hirst and Peters, 1970; Holt, 1978; White, 1973; Becher and
Maclure, 1978) .

But all those who have advocated a common

curriculum do not seem to be delighted to accept it.
White, for example, criticizes it as "not helpful" because
of a lack of

educational aims (pp. 9-14).

Statements of

rationale are so ambiguous, he argues, that a tyrant like
Hitler or Stalin would accept these as statements of their
educational aims.

Besides, the ten foundation subjects are

almost identical to the ones Stalin had and the three core

subjects - language, mathematics and science - were also
named as "important subjects" by Stalin.

Mclean and

Voskrensenskaya (1992) declare that it "failed in the long
term" (p. 72) because it was an educational revolution from
above, in the same way Gorbachev's perestroika in the
Soviet Union failed because it was from above.

Ball and

Bowe (1992) argue that the present developments regarding
the Act "are not resulting in a curricular provision that
is driven by the market, but a provision that is driven by
serendipity, ad hocery chaos and the minimum planning that
such circumstances allow" and that "the cost of all this
within schools is measured by teachers' stress, resentment,
illness, absenteeism and the number of those leaving the
profession" (p. 98) .

Furthermore, they see the Act, from

an obvious hermeneutical view, as a text and argue that the
state control model is analytically very limited because
the authors of the National Curriculum are limited in their
capacity to control the meanings embedded in the texts; as
a result, such texts are read and appreciated differently
in different settings (P. 113).
However, according to another report (Cox, Evans and
Sanders, 1992), teachers' attitudes towards the National

Curriculum are not so negative.

Generally, they view the

attainment tests negatively but think the National
Curriculum will not seriously deprive the classroom teacher
of professional freedom and scope for initiative.

They

also do not consider the introduction of the National
Curriculum as an educationally backward move.
One of the reasons that the teachers do not see the
National Curriculum as a threat to their professionality
seems to be the fact that the National Curriculum does not
seize teachers' actual right regarding the curriculum
content they have been possessing.

Despite the fact that

the foundation and core subjects in the National Curriculum
may be strikingly similar to those of Stalin's curriculum
or even to those of the Korean curriculum, those do not
mean subject names by which schools actually teach
students.

There are no regulations, unlike the Korean

curriculum, regarding time allotment or regarding subjects
that should be taught in a particular grade or semester.
Neither the Act nor the National Curriculum prescribes the
objectives of the grade schools or of each subject.
According to the National Curriculum Council:
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The use of subjects to define the National Curriculum does not
mean that teaching has to be organized and delivered within
prescribed subject boundaries. Subject descriptions reflect the
way in which school curriculum is now most often planned and, in
secondary schools, also organized (Ball and Bowe, 1952, p. 102) .

The actual right to organize and to implement curriculum in
each school still remains in the hands of principals and
teachers.

In other words, from the teachers' standpoint,

nothing much has changed in what and how to teach, except
the attainment tests.

This has been also foreseen by a

study right before the Act:
The prognosis, however, is that British schools in the 1990s
will be very similar institutions to those around today and that
the curriculum will also appear very similar. (Jones, 1985, p.
48)

The Act grants individual schools a right to demand
funds directly from the central government so that the
right of local educational authorities is considerably
weakened and that of schools and parents enforced.

The

main concern of the British National Curriculum seems to
be, in the end, in the attainment tests rather than in what
to teach and, borrowing Elmore's and Weiler's terms, in
securing the government’s share of power in access to
curriculum decision without jeopardizing their
legitimation.
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2.5. Centralization vs. Decentralization Revisited
From the examples of the United States and England,
debates about centralization and decentralization have been .
shown to be centered mostly around administrative hegemony,
not around what should actually be taught in concrete
classrooms, and thus have little influence on teaching
practice.

Although curriculum policies of these two

countries can not be said to be completely decentralized,
teachers in these countries, unlike Korean teachers, appear
to have some extent of autonomy in deciding what and how to
teach.

No matter to what degree the central power over the

curriculum policy is decentralized, however, actual
classroom practices tend to remain largely the same, as has
been frequently pointed out.

This is, and will likely be,

the case for the new Korean curriculum, too.

Even if the

level of decentralization or localization in the new Korean
curriculum has been proved to be far behind that of the
United States and England, actual influence of the
curriculum policy on classroom practice is not so great.
Speaking more concretely, science teachers in England under
the new centralized curriculum policy and those in Korea
under the new localized policy may not have to be
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distressed about what and how to teach, nor they must fear
lest the time-tables in schools should disappear suddenly.
From a Foucauldian view, debates about centralization
and decentralization which have been provided so far are
themselves meaningless, or at least stale, because power no
longer centers around the .State. Aiming obviously at such
Marxists as Althusser (1971), Foucault (1980) categorizes
the way power is exercised only in terms of the State
apparatus as "juridical" (p. 115).

He suggests another

frame of power analysis; that is power-knowledge.

This

concept of power-knowledge decentralizes the State from the
center of discourses regarding power and overcomes the
State-people dichotomy in power relations.
We should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine
that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are
suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its
injunctions, its demands and its interests...We should admit
rather that power produces knowledge
(and not simply by
encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because
it is useful)? that power and knowledge directly imply one
another; that there is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that
does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations. (Foucault, 1979a, pp. 94-95)

According to him, knowledge is developed by the exercise of
power and is used in turn to legitimate further exercise of
power.

School is most frequently articulated by Foucault as
an institution of govemmentalization, which he uses to
analyze complex power relations in the modern
industrialized society.

Instead of violent and brutal

exercise of power, the new and gentle methods of
discipline, "not to punish less, but to punish better"
(1979a, p. 82), have emerged in order to produce docile
bodies.

School is one of those gentle and "caring"

institutions, along with the prison, hospital, asylum,
military, and work place, within which knowledge has been
developed, refined, and used to shape individuals in more
elaborate and fine ways.
What makes teachers' classroom practices remain
unchanged, especially regarding the content, in spite of
centralized or decentralized curriculum policy?

Why do

teachers teach nothing too much differently from what the
central or state governments, or more generally, people of
the society want to them to?
Answering these questions, Foucault's approach seems
to be very useful.

While Cherryholmes (1988) tries to

explain why reform attempts, such as the efforts to
centralize curriculum in the United States, do not usually
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have much influence on the actual teacher's classroom using
a Foucauldian approach, his explanation overlooks
Foucault's insight into power-knowledge relations.
The immense size, complexity, and decentralized nature of
American
education
mitigates
against
quickly
instituted,
enduring changes.
Foucault's approach to discursive practices
provides a likely characterization of American education as an
anonymous, powerful, slowly changing discourse that we inherit
and over which we have little control. {Cherryholms, 1988, p.
135)

Cherryholmes seems to be right in pointing out that we
have little control over an anonymous and powerful
discourse that is a product of power-knowledge
relationship, but he fails to explain more concretely that
the teacher's own professionality or specialty itself is a
product of power and that the teacher or his/her own
subject itself implies power.

The teacher usually thinks

that his/her own field of knowledge is outside power
relations and that his/her profession is to teach this
knowledge to the student regardless of the changes of
curriculum policy.

Thus, the teacher shows no serious

interest in the changes of curriculum policy as far as it
does not infringe his/her professionality - to teach
his/her own professionalized knowledge as a fixed
knowledge.

Historically, the general content of education has
been justified under various names such as disciplines,
subjects, forms of knowledge, or basics by J. Bruner
(1959), H. Broudy (1964), P. Phenix (1964), and J. Schwab
(1964) in the United States and R. Peters (1970), P. Hirst
(1970), and J. White (1973) in England.

In this process,

as Cherryholmes indicates, invoking Derridean
deconstructionism, disciplinary structure became a
transcendental signified for curriculum (p. 13 9) .

A

teacher usually has one's own field or subject and thinks
s/he is "specialized" or "professionalized" in that
discipline.

But s/he hardly recognizes that

professionalization of knowledge is a form of a discipline
to create "docile bodies" which may be subjected, used,
transformed and improved.

To quote Foucault again, there

is no power relation without the correlative constitution
of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.
Time-tables, classifications, and examinations which do not
seem to disappear in schools, regardless of which
curriculum policy, centralized or decentralized, they take,
are also other major examples Foucault refers to directly
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as methods to discipline docile bodies (1979a, pp. 149,
181, 184).
Thus, it is no more than an illusion for the teacher
to think that all s/he must do is to teach his or her
"professionalized" and "politically neutralized" knowledge
regardless of the changes in curriculum policy.

It is also

an illusion for the teacher to think that s/he can produce
his or her own discourse and become a "subject" under a
decentralized (from the State or a political power)
curriculum policy because discourse produces the subject,'
not vice versa.

Under a decentralized and individualized

curriculum policy, it might seem to be possible that the
teacher can be an autonomous subject and can produce
autonomous subjects.

However, for Foucault, not only

totalizing but also individualizing forms of power are used
("a double bind"; 1983, p. 216) as technologies of
producing docile bodies.
At the local level, of course, there is often a high degree of
conscious decision making, planning, plotting and coordination
of political activity.
Foucault refers to this as ''the local
cynicism of power"...The fact that individuals make decisions
about specific policies or particular groups jockey for their
own advantage does not mean that overall activation and
directionality of power relations in a society implies a
subject. (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 187)
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He suggests individualization is maximal for the upper
regions of power in a feudal society: the more power or
privilege one holds, the more one is marked out as an
individual.

In a disciplinary rigime, on the other hand,

individualization is descendant: to the extent that power
itself becomes more anonymous and functional, those on whom
it is exercised tend to be the more strongly individualized
(Foucault, 1979a, pp. 192-194).
Foucault describes the school as a blockage of
capacity-communication-power (1983, p. 218) .

The school is

an important part of society's regime of truth, that is,
"the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function
as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which
each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who
are charged with saying what counts as true"

(1980, p.

131) .
The following description by Cherryholmes shows how
regime of truth occurs actually in schools:
Educators speak as educators, for example, after becoming
proficient in their professional discourses.
Certifiably so.
Following certification one is permitted or asked or compensated
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to speak with authority on education.
Such speakers, however,
have no direct access to the origins of the discourses. (1988,
p. 34)

Not only the teacher him- or herself is a docile body but
s/he also creates docile bodies unless s/he comes awakened
from his or her illusion that s/he can reach "the lost
origin"

{Foucault, 1977, p. 143) of his or her knowledge

and unless s/he struggles against the regime of truth with
which s/he engaged and within which s/he is constituted.
This struggle should be not only against centralized power
but also against decentralized or individualized power.
The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social,
philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the
individual from the state, and from the state's institutions,
but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of
individualization which is linked to the state.
We have to
promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this
kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several
centuries. (Foucault, 1983, p. 216)

As Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest (pp. 206-207), Foucault
leaves to his readers questions about the concrete methods
and strategies of liberation, resistance, or struggle.
However, he clearly and frequently expresses his opposition
to all kinds of universal and totalizing discourses; this
permeates all his writings.

For him, intellectual does not

mean the "bearer of universal values" (1980, p. 132).
Rather, it is the person occupying a specific position -

but whose specificity is linked to the general functioning
of an apparatus of truth.
and specific.

Thus, the struggle must be local

Only this local and specific struggle can

have effects and implications which are not simply
professional and sectoral.

The intellectual can operate

and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth
which is so essential to the structure and functioning of
our society.
Thus seen, the Foucauldian sense of localization is
not just a relinquishment of power from the State but a
struggle against all kinds of disciplinary discourses -totalized or individualized, violent or gentle, blatant or
subtle.

This struggle is a role of intellectuals, thus of

educators and teachers.

CHAPTER THREE
TOWARD A NEW CONCEPT OF LOCAL CURRICULUM

3.1. Foucauldian Locality and Local Struggle
In fact, the way that we should resist or struggle
against the disciplinary power and the possibility of the
resistance or struggle itself are not at all obvious in
most of Foucault's writings.

It may be because he is

"notorious for his reluctance to make value judgements"
{Kusch, 1991, p. 218} or because of his "ascetic refusal to
go beyond his concrete demonstrations"
Rabinow, 1983, p. 205).

(Dreyfus and

The concept of locality is not

directly mentioned in the writings by and about Foucault.
The concept of locality is usually presupposed tacitly as a
main theme in the Foucauldian theory of power-knowledge,
and it is also an important point at which Foucault's post
structuralism is linked to postmodernism.

As the word

"post-structuralism" suggests, such key ideas as
decentralization and difference are omnipresent in
Foucault's thought.
First of all, for Foucault, the concept of power is
decentralized from and non-reductive to the State, as
71

described in the preceding chapter.

Thus, a political

change in modern history when capitalism emerged was not a
transmission of power from the State to civil society but
an increased governmentalization of power relations.

He

does not think of power in the sense of a unified state
apparatus whose task is to ensure the subjection of the
citizens of a particular society.

Nor does he mean a

general system of domination exerted by one group over
another, the effect of which spreads to the whole society.
Power should be understood as the multiplicity of power
relations at work in a particular area of society.
does not reside in some primary, central point.

Power

Power is

ubiquitous because it is produced at every moment: "Power
is everywhere... Power is not an institution, nor a
structure, nor a possession.

It is a name we give to a

complex strategic situation in a particular society"
(Foucault, 1979b, p. 93).

In the process of

governmentalization, which denotes the shift of power
relations between the sovereign and individuals from the
time of Machiavelli to the modern state (Marshall, 1990, p.
15), methods which Foucault calls micro-technology are
used.

These methods bring together the exercise of power
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and the constitution of knowledge in the organization of
space and time along ordered lines, so as to facilitate
constant forms of surveillance and the operation of
evaluation and judgement.

Thus, power-knowledge produces a

distinction between normality and abnormality.

This view

of the power-knowledge relation presupposes locality and
particularity of truth and is very different from the
traditional Marxist view of ideology.

According to the

classical Marxist view, power relates to knowledge
primarily through the ways it serves to distort or mystify
the truth.

However, according to Foucault:

Truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a
myth whose history and functions would repay further study,
truth isn't the reward of free spirits. . .Truth is a thing of
this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of
constraint.
And it induces regular effects of power.
Each
society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of
truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means
by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those
who are charged with saying what counts as true. (1980, p. 131)

In order to analyze this power-knowledge relations, he
uses genealogy, which also shows his strong antagonism
toward any kind of universal and totalizing discourse.
Genealogy denies continuity in history and "does not
pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken

continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten
things."

Neither is it genealogy's duty "to demonstrate

that the past activity exists in the present, that it
continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a
predetermined form to all its vicissitudes"

(1977, p. 146) .

So, for Foucault, an exploration into the past (which is an
examination of or search for "descent") is "not the
erecting foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was
previously considered immobile; it fragments what was
thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was
imagined consistent with itself" (1977, p. 147) .

He seems

to be denying the Western optimism that the absolute and
universal Truth lies at the origin of what we know, and
says, "the origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, the
point where truth of things correspond to a truthful
discourse, the site of a fleeting articulation that
discourse has obscured and finally lost" (1977, p. 143) .
What is important for Foucault is not search for the lost
origin, the absolute Truth, or the universal and unifying
Spirit but faithful genealogical exploration into the past.
If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics,
if he listens to history, he finds that there is "something
altogether different" behind the things: not a timeless and
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essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or
that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from
alien forms.

(1977, p. 142)

This genealogical exploration into the past made him notice
such local and subjugated things as discontinuity,
irrationality, and madness which had been "behind the
things," that is, behind the disguise of continuity and
universal rationality of history.

His focuses were, in

structuralist terms, not only on the historical presences,
but equally on the absences which had made the presences
present in history by way of differences.

He freely

travels into the past, "free from the restraints of
positive knowledge," and "descends to seize the various
perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences, to
leave things undisturbed in their own dimension and
intensity" (1977, p. 156).
However, once again, he warns against the danger of
totalization in genealogy:
these genealogies... were not possible and could not have been
attempted except on one condition, namely that the tyranny of
globalising discourses with their hierarchy and all their
privileges of a theoretical avant-garde was eliminated, (1980,
p. 83)

His local, and probably too humble, attitude towards power
and struggle made some critics call his description of

power "Schopenhauerian will"
which no one is responsible.

(Taylor, 1986, p. 88) for
This line of criticism

usually comes from those who prefer emancipatory discourse.
As Lather maintains (1990, p. 32), however, the
emancipatory discourse is much a part of Foucault's "rdgime
of truth."

In the Foucauldian space, the binaries that

structure so much of emancipatory discourse implode from
"us versus them" to a multi-centered discourse with
differential access to power.

The totalizing desire to

establish foundations is displaced by a move toward a self
critique that traces our own collusion in the very cultural
dominations we are opposing via the intersection of our
liberatory intentions and the "will to power" that
underscores interpretation.
For Foucault, power is not the prerogative of a
dominant class which exercises it actively upon a passive,
dominated class; and the working class, or the
intellectual, has no historical mission in acquiring it.
Actually, there can be no such thing as a historical
mission in Foucauldian historical contingency.

Because

power is multiple and ubiquitous, the struggle against it
must be localized.

Although genealogy is a radical form of

criticism, its specific critical contribution is not so
much, or not primarily, to criticize institutions and
persons, but instead to make criticizable the forms of
knowledge, the standards of rationality, or principles of
reasoning not only on the basis of which such institutions
arise and turn out to be "reasonable," "useful" and "selfevident," but also on the basis of which the violence of
these institutions becomes natural and justifiable (Kusch,
1991, p. 214).

The power relation is not to be found in

terms of causality, of events at one level causing or
explaining events on another, but rather in a series of
aims and objectives.

However, these are not attributable

to an individual subject, not even to a ruling caste, but
arise in an apparently anonymous way from local situations
in which they first appear.

Where there is power there is

resistance; power relations depend on a multiplicity of
points of resistance, which serve at once as adversary
target, support, foothold (Sarup, 1983, p. 99).
So, rather than analyzing the working of factually
existing institutions, genealogy seeks to identify the
network of knowledge, the standards of rationality or
rationalities that make these institutions possible and

that justify them.

Since it is the central premiss of

genealogy that knowledge and power are internallyessentially related, genealogy cannot remain on the level
of violence and coercion in institutions like prison; it
has to study the frameworks of thinking and knowledge that
inform these institutions.

As Foucault himself admits

(1977, pp. 206-207), activities and effects of The Groupe
d ‘Information sur les Prisons (6.1.P.) in the years 19711972 (Foucault, 1980, p. 143; Patton, 1979, pp. 109-111,
138; Sheridan, 1980, p. 130) illustrate this genealogical
concept of local struggle and local victory.
Some Marxists criticize Foucauldian theory as
"abandoning class analysis," "ignoring that disciplinary
power techniques are applied precisely to ensure the
reproduction of the social relations of the capitalist mode
of production," and "severing power relations from an
understanding of class domination and the state as a
political form of the rule of the capital"

(Sarup, 1983, p.

101) .
Foucault not only rejects class analysis, which attempts to
derive existing forms of power from the productive relations of
capitalist society,- he also repudiates the concepts of ideology,
state and party.
The Foucauldian approach, though it produces
very interesting work, puts into question many categories that
marxists take for granted,

{p. 102)
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However, the points that are made by some critics as
weaknesses of Foucauldian theory, on the contrary, give us
an important insight into the way of breaking the limit
placed by an attempt to understand society from a
totalitarian view.

A myth of totalization and

universalization not only evidences the teleological
speculation immanent in the Marxist view of history but
also is related to the reductionistic tendency which
reduces all social problems to the capitalist mode of
production.

This reductionism is inherent also in class

determinism and econo-centrism.

This seems to be the

fundamental reason that so-called orthodox Marxism has
become vulgarized and dogmatized despite its embellishment
with dialectic and praxis, which can be seen easily in
social movements in Korea.

Through discourse analysis

which decenters and localizes power, the Foucauldian
approach contributes to extend the logic of resistance and
liberation by unshackling it from the teleological
speculation.
Thus, despite some critics' interpretation of "his
(

^

reluctance to make value judgements," Foucault's attitude

/
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towards the possibility and form of resistance to power is
pretty firm:
One should not assume a massive and primal condition of
domination, a binary structure with 'dominators' on one side and
'dominated' on the other, but rather a multiform production of
relations of domination which are partially susceptible of
integration into overall strategies... there are no relations of
power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and
effective because they are formed right at the point where
relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not
have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably
frustrated through being the compatriot of power.
It exists all
the more by being in the same place as power; hence like power,
resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global
strategies. (1980, p. 142)

Foucault calls the element of resistance inherent in power
relations "a certain plebeian quality aspect" {p. 138) .
While doubting that the plebs is a genuine sociological
entity, and while denying that the plebs can be identified
with the proletariat, he suggests that the plebeian quality
is "a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge"
and that it can be found all over the social body "in a
diversity of forms and extensions, of energies and
irreducibilities":
This measure of plebs is not so much what stands outside
relations of power as it is their limit, their underside, their
counter-stroke, that which responds to every advance of power by
a movement of disengagement {p. 138).

3.2. Local Intellectual and Local Knowledge
As a matter of course, Foucault does not think every
power relation is bad in itself although he describes

mainly negative and repressive power in one of his early
writings (1971).

He makes a distinction between inevitable

or harmless, and avoidable or harmful forms of power.
Thus, because "'truth' is linked in a circular relation
with systems of power," we cannot emancipate it "from every
system of power {which would be a chimera, for truth is
already power)."

What matters is to detach "the power of

truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and
cultural, within which it operates at the present time"
(1980, p. 133).

While, as described before, genealogy is

suggested by Foucault himself as the concrete method of
analyzing hegemonial power, he makes it clear in many other
contexts that the form of power against which we should
struggle is a "negative," "repressive," "bad form of", or
"hegemonial" power.

But, according to him, a mode of

action which acts directly and immediately on others is not
power.

He excludes this mode of action from the concept of

power, thus also from the hegemonial power, calling it
violence.
Power exists only when it is put into action... it acts upon
their {other’s) actions: an action upon an action, on existing
actions or on those which may arise in the present or the
future.
A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon
things...On the other hand a power relationship can only be
articulated on the basis of two elements which are indispensable
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if it is really to be a power relationship: that "the other"
(the one whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and
maintained to the very end as a person who acts...In itself the
exercise of power is not violence. (1983, pp. 219-220)

Thus, Foucault's (local) struggle or resistance is
only against hegemonial power, analyzing and deconstructing
the system of discourses produced by the combination of
hegemonial power and knowledge.

This local struggle cannot

be performed by the "universal" intellectual, the "bearer
of universal value"

(1980, p. 132) who was "derived from a

quite specific historical figure: the man of justice, the
man of law, who counterposes to power, despotism and the
abuses and arrogance of wealth, the universality of justice
and the equity of an ideal law" (p. 128).

The universal

intellectual speaks for humanity with the tone of prophecy
and promised pleasure and locates him- or herself, as
spokesman for conscience and consciousness, in the
privileged spot "outside of power and within the truth"
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 130).

Foucault advises the

intellectual to abandon his arrogance or, perhaps, burden
of "can and must apply universally"

(1980, p. 128) and

emphasizes the role of the new local or specialized
intellectual.
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The figure in which the functions and prestige of this new
intellectual are concentrated is no longer that of the 'writer
of genius1, but that of the 'absolute savant1, no longer he who
bears the values of all, opposes the unjust sovereign or his
ministers and makes his cry resound even beyond the grave.
It
is rather he who, along with a handful of others, has at his
disposal, whether in the service of the State or against it,
powers which can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life. He
is no longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist
of life and death. (1980, p. 129)

Because Foucault describes the term of local or specific
intellectual always as "not of the universal intellectual,"
the meaning of the term is somewhat ambiguous and
uncertain, which Foucault himself admits (1980, p. 132) .
However, Poster observes the specific intellectual as "a
creature of the twentieth century with its fragmentation of
knowledge, its multiplication of disciplines, its infinite
expansion of research centers, its explosion of the printed
world, its professionalization of discourse"
in Kenway, 1990, p. 175).

(1982, quoted

In other words, Foucault

decenters the universality and centrality of the
(universal) intellectual.

While the universal intellectual

claims to struggle for the universal Truth, the local
intellectual's aim is more humble and vivid.

While the

former can be easily isolated from the masses because of
the abstractness of his aim, the latter can struggle
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against hegemonial power more effectively by virtue of the
vividness and concreteness of his aim.
Like the universal intellectual in Marxist discourse
of ideological struggle, the local and specific
intellectual is referred to in the context of (local)
struggle against hegemonial power.

Thus, such writers as

Giroux (1992; 1988; Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991) and Kenway
(1990) equate the Foucauldian local and specific
intellectual with the counter-hegemonic intellectual
described in Gramsci's hegemony theory although Aronowitz
distinguishes Foucauldian intellectual's work, calling it
"antihegemonic," from Marxism's counter-hegemony to
liberalism or dictatorship (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991, p.
155).

Giroux maintains that Foucault's notion of the

specific intellectual must be combined with Gramsci's
notion of the engaged intellectual "who connects his or her
work to broader social concerns that deeply affect how
people live, work, and survive"

(1992, p. 82).

This

equation or combination of Foucault's and Gramsci's
intellectual seems to be possible because the hard-liner
Italian communist, like his non-Marxist counterpart and
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unlike other Marxist theorists, negates econo-centrism and
class determinism.
However, all the ideological critiques, including
Gramsci's concept of hegemony which is said to be built on
ideology, presuppose, at least "ideologically," a state of
truth after being awakened from false consciousness.

Thus,

the ideological critiques tacitly presuppose the
bifurcation between false consciousness and truth, on which
Foucault does not agree.

For Foucault, as quoted at the

beginning of this section, we cannot emancipate truth from
every system of power because truth is already power.

So,

"the essential political problem for the intellectual is
not to criticise the ideological contents supposedly linked
to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice
is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of
ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics
of truth.

The problem is not changing people's

consciousness...but the political, economic, institutional
regime of the production of truth" (1980, p. 133).

Truth

is not a privilege which can be enjoyed only by those who
have emancipated themselves from false consciousness.

It

is not "the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered
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and accepted" but rather "the ensemble of rules according
to which the true and the false are separated and specific
effects of power attached to the true"

(1980, p. 132) .

The local struggle or resistance by the local or
specific intellectual aims, in the end, at analyzing and
deconstructing the present social, economic, and cultural
hegemony by detaching the power of truth from them.

As

examples of these local struggles, Foucault lists those
which have emerged since the late 1960s: women have begun
to question male dominance more radically, children
question the authority of their parents, and psychiatry is
criticized for its control over the mentally ill, medicine
is criticized for its treatment of the sick, and
administrations and bureaucracies are criticized for their
interventions in the realm of the individual
211).

(1983, p.

These resistances have similar local character, that

indicates "an autonomous, non-centralized kind of
theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity
is not dependent on the approval of the established regime
of thought" (1980, p. 81).

Local, specific, or subjugated

knowledge means, on the one hand, "historical contents that
have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence
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or formal systemisation" and, on the other, "something
which in a sense is altogether different, namely a whole
set of knowledge that have been disqualified as inadequate
to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the
required level of cognition or scientificity"

(1980, pp.

81-82) .
For Foucault, knowledge is arbitrary and truth is
related to particular rationalities.

He does not believe

in the absolute truth or universal rationality.

In every

society, the production of discourse, the word Foucault
uses interchangingly with knowledge, is "at once
controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according
to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert
its power and its dangers"

(1971, p. 216).

There are a

number of procedures of exclusion operating in discourse.
Those are prohibition, division-rejection, and opposition
between the true and the false.

Needless to say, the third

procedure of exclusion, that is, the opposition between the
true and false, is the most dominant and the most allpervasive although Foucault admits that speaking of the
opposition is "a little risky" (p. 217).

It is risky
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because he apparently does not want to be fettered with the
absolute relativism or Sophists' paradox.

Thus, he says:

Certainly, as a proposition, the division between true and false
is neither arbitrary, nor modifiable, nor institutional, nor
violent. Putting the question in different terms, however -asking what has been, what still is , throughout our discourse,
this will to truth which has survived throughout so many
centuries of our history; or if we ask what is, in its very
general form, the kind of division governing our will to
knowledge -- then we may well discern something like a system of
exclusion (historical, modifiable, institutionally constraining)
in the process of development, (p. 218)

The truth, and power, of discourse resided, not in what was
said, but in who said it and how it was said.

Plato's will

to seek true knowledge also could not be excluded from this
Foucauldian concept of will to truth or to knowledge.

In

discussing how different disciplines are constituted, he
shows that knowledge can fix meaning, representation, and
reason; that the very organization of the discourse can be
an exercise of power, controlling and restraining what can
be said as well as the right to speak.

Formation of the

modern human sciences, too, is a new feature of the will to
truth and knowledge and is to discipline people effectively
(1979a; 1979b).
However, while he urges insurrection of the local and
subjugated knowledge against the privileged, so-called
"absolute and universal" knowledge, and while he holds that

rational judgements can only be made on the basis of
historically contingent standards, the concept of the local
knowledge does not seem to be endorsing Kuhnian cyclical
incommensurability.

Instead, Foucault himself

demonstrates, case by case, how allegedly timeless
categories have had historically contingent origins, as his
works show.

Thus, in a very similar way that Lyotard

presupposes the existence of the particular rule(s) in a
particular language game, Foucault denies neither the use
of the concepts "true" and "false" nor the possibility of
the particular and local rationality within one local
discourse.
3.3. Lyotard and Locality
Although the existence of a set of rules is necessary
in order for us to communicate at all with one another in a
particular language game, Lyotard does not admit any
possibility of communication between different language
games.

His main point in the debates regarding

postmodernism is very simple and flat: rejection of all
kinds of grand theories.

He defines postmodern as

"incredulity toward metanarratives"

(1984, p. xxiv).

According to him, science, especially contemporary science,
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has tried to legitimate its existence, since Plato, with
recourse to (philosophical) narrative because "the language
game of science does not have the resources to legitimate
their truth on its own" (1984, p. 28) .

Science shuffles

off the legitimation to the (philosophical) narrative and
seeks the good, justice, truth, emancipation, progress,
etc.

Lyotard calls this grand narrative.
Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is true
knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of
knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all.
(1984, p. 29)

He sees contemporary science, which is founded on and which
seeks for performativity and efficiency, as positivistic
(1984, pp. 53-54) . Needless to say, his pejorative use of
the word "positivism" reflects the history of the debates
about the nature of science, after the demise of logical
positivism and after Kuhn and Feyerabend.

In the

postmodern science,
working on a proof means searching for and
"inventing"
counterexamples, in other words, the unintelligible; supporting
an arguments means looking for a "paradox" and legitimating it
with new rules in the games of reasoning. (1984, p. 54)

The anti-metanarrative theme is characterized as a
surprising transformation, new experiments, or a sudden
rupture with the past.

It is rejection of social, moral,

political, or psychological theories, as well as any

metaphysical or epistemological views that posit a
synthetic or natural/ historical telos towards which we are
inevitably heading or which we might prescribe.

The

postmodern science rejects any identification with any
established systems of knowledge by undermining
continuously its own basis of legitimation.

Its

legitimation process is equated with the generation of
other statements and other rules of language game.
"Science possesses no. general metalanguage in which all
other languages can be transcribed and evaluated"
64).

(1984, p.

There is no "grand scheme" of the natural and social

world that is unfolding or capable of being enacted.
Lyotard criticizes those totalizing social theories of
Parsons and Luhmann.

He calls those "terrorist."

By

terror he means,
the
efficiency gained by eliminating,
or threatening to
eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him.
He is silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but
because his ability to participate has been threatened (there
are many ways to prevent someone from playing). The decision
makers' arrogance, which in principle has no equivalent in the
sciences, consists in the exercise of terror. (19B4, pp. 63-64)

He, in a strikingly similar way to Foucault's
explanation of knowledge and power, combines the problems
of knowledge with those of society.

According to him, the
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question of the legitimacy of science has been
indissociably linked to that of the legislator since the
time of Plato.
The right to decide what is true is not independent of the right
to decide what is just...there is a strict interlinkage between
the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics
and politics.. .knowledge and power are simply two sides of the
same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what
needs to be decided?
In the computer age, the question of
knowledge is now more than ever a question of government. (1984,
pp. S-9)

In this postmodern computer age, then, knowing tends to
"amoralize" itself because knowledge is no longer mindtraining power (Bildung)
consumption.
(1984, p. 5).

(1984, p. 4) but an object of

"Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself"
It no longer matters whether knowledge

contributes to a grand, synthetic telos.

But he never sees

the postmodern society as being amoral, that is, putting
ethical problems aside, and depending only upon the
automatized information process.

Thus, he criticizes

Habermas's concept of the universal Diskurs which is
allegedly based on the universal consensus through
communication as "doing violence to the heterogeneity of
language games" (1984, p. xxv).

Lyotard maintains:

Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value.
But justice
as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect. (1984, p. 66)

In fact, he locates Christianity as the root of the
"Occident" grand narrative such as Habermas's project of
Enlightenment, Hegel's dialectic of Spirit, or Marx's
project of emancipation which seems to have "lost all of
its critical power" as ethical and political theory after
the Berlin Wall fell {1993, p. 114) . Against
metanarratives which totalize historical experience by
reducing its diversity to a one-dimensional, allencompassing logic, he posits a discourse of multiple
horizons, the play of language games, and the terrain of
micropolitics.

As Giroux summarizes (1991, pp. 19-20),

Lyotard, against the formal logic of identity and the
transhistorical subject, invokes a dialectics of
indeterminacy, varied discourses of legitimation, and a
politics based on the "permanence of difference."
In order to advocate postmodern culture, Lyotard
borrows Wittgenstein's concept of language games.

In his

view, all the events in postmodern society are language
games or transformations of them, and the language games
can be analyzed in terms of their performativity and
consequent claims to legitimation and power.

The narrative

form lends itself to a great variety of language games,
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among which are denotative statements about the natural
world; denotic statements regarding social relations;
interrogatives, evaluatives and so forth (1984, pp. 9-10).
Language game is defined as follows:
Each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in
terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which
they can be put - - i n exactly the same way as the game of chess
is defined by a set of rules determining the properties of each
pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them (1984, p.
10) .

Language games have the following three rules.

First,

their rules do not carry within themselves their own
legitimation but are the object of a contract, explicit or
not, between players.

Second, if there are no rules, there

is no game, that even an infinitesimal modification of one
rule alters the nature of the game, that a "move" or
utterance that does not satisfy the rules does not belong
to the game they define.

Third, every utterance should be

thought of as a "move" in a game (1984, p. 10).
Thus shown, Lyotard's emphasis in his reading of
Wittgenstein is obvious.

He seems to be combining

Wittgenstein's language game with the arbitrary character
of signifier, signified, and thus, language in Saussurian
linguistics.

He wants to focus on the arbitrary character

of the rules of the various language games and of the

various forms of life, and eventually of the thing we call
knowledge.

Consequently, the character of postmodern

knowledge consists, unlike Habermas's argument, in
dissension, not in consensus in opinion.
horizon that is never reached"

"Consensus is a

(1984, p. 61).

Because the

professional or the elite has the power to decide which
knowledge should be acquired by consensus and which
knowledge is true, in Lyotard's view, paralleling
Foucault's, Habermas advocates knowledge produced by the
elite.

On the contrary,

it is possible to conceive the world of postmodern knowledge as
governed by a game of perfect information, in the sense that the
data is in principle accessible to any expert: there is no
scientific secret.
Given equal competence (no longer in the
acquisition of knowledge, but its production), what extra
performativity
depends
on
in
the
final
analysis
is
"imagination," which allows one either to make a new move or
change the rules of the game. (1984, p. 52)

As it is impossible to judge the existence or validity of
narrative knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge
and vice versa (1984, p. 26), and as nobody speaks all
languages and there is no universal metalanguage (1984, p.
41), a particular language game can not dominate nor
control (an)other language game(s).

There is an

incommensurability between language games (1984, p. 23).
This recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language
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games is, for Lyotard, a first step to an idea and practice
of justice that is not linked to that of consensus.

The

second step is
The principle that any consensus on the rule defining a game and
the "moves" playable within it must be local, in other words,
agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual
cancellation (1984, p. 66) .

Thus, Lyotard sees all kinds of knowledge, language
games, and forms of life as locally determined.

In other

words, validity of knowledge is judged only in a particular
language game by the local players of the game, here and
now, and is not transferable to any other forms of
knowledge or language games.

Viewed in this light, Lyotard

does not seem to reject a possibility of consensus between
the players at least in a language game, and at least in
his The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, which
is most frequently referred to among his writings and on
which this section of my study is mostly dependent.

As a

matter of fact, the latter Wittgenstein's concept of
language games presupposes consensus of opinion among the
participants of a particular language game, which becomes
ironically, as Prado describes (1992), the foundation of
Habermas's universal pragmatics.

However, after his

Postmodern Condition, Lyotard develops further the concept
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of incommensurability so that he finally denies any
possibility of consensus within a language game, not to
mention between language games.

Whereas he later renounces

the concept of language game and atomizes it to the
incommensurability between phrases

(1988; 1987; Lecercle,

1992), he suggests, even within a language game, an
incommensurability between addressor and addressee.
Not only is there an incommensurability within a game between
the position of recipient and that of utterer, for example (it
is not always pronounced, but it is extreme in the case
of
obligation), but from game to game, for the "same" position,
there is incommensurability: it is not the same thing to be the
recipient of a narrative,
and to be the recipient of a
denotative discourse with a function of truthfulness, or to be
the recipient of a command.

(Lyotard and Thdbaud,

1985, p. 94)

In other words, "tolerance of differences" has been
replaced with "respect of differences" in his later works;
thus, "a radical pluralism" and "an absolute relativism"
have become often-used words to criticize Lyotard.

This

makes some critics, in Giroux's terms (Aronowitz and
Giroux, 1991, p. 68) , appropriate Lyotardian postmodernism
in a reactionary way and others in a progressive way.
It is still disputable whether his emphasis on "the
transition between heterogeneous phrases" and on
"respecting their heterogeneity"

(Lyotard, 1987, p. 180)

can be identified with absolute relativism in epistemology
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and ethics, or whether he abandoned his interest in truth
and justice at all.

It seems to be sufficient in this

study, however, to point out that Lyotard has never given
up his interest in truth and justice, at least in his
Postmodern Condition, and that, on the contrary, the main
interest of his philosophy is in truth and justice, as
analyzed so far in this section.

He does not insist on the

impossibility of truth claims and of moral judgement, but
on the possibility of local, and thus plural and multiple,
processes of verification and justification according to
the various language games.
3.4. A New Concept of Local Curriculum
Whereas Foucault says that we should struggle only
against a "negative," "repressive," or "hegemonial" power,
as was described in section 3.2., he admits the anonymity
and evasiveness of power.
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did
anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought
to obey it?
What makes power holds good, what makes it
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as
a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things,
it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse.
It
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative
instance whose function is repression.

(1980, p. 119)

"Human sciences" are good examples of disciplinary forms of
knowledge which, by objectifying and materializing people,
are used to superimpose the power and to produce docile
bodies.

According to Foucault, a developed industrial

society is the carceral, all across which power-knowledge
relations distinguish the normal from the abnormal, to
qualify, to classify and to punish, using the human
sciences ("from psychiatry to pedagogy, from the diagnosis
of diseases to the hiring of labour"; 1979a, p. 185) as
technique of judgement and examination.

The human sciences

make disciplinary power exercised "invisibly."

The school

is "a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination"
(1979a, p. 186), where this disciplinary power, with the
help of the human sciences, forms "a whole series of codes
of disciplinary individuality"

(1979a, p. 189) and makes

each individual a "case" (1979a, p. 191) .

The human

sciences therefore play an important part in the creation
of disciplined subjects, that is, individuals who conform
to certain standards of sanity, health, docility,
competence, and so on.

This kind of epistemic view on the

human science, or knowledge and discourse at large, can
never entail a sense of the absolute Truth or of a unifying

rationality.

Rather, as Kusch describes (1991, p. 215),

Foucault stresses the analysis of rationality in the
plural.

However, Foucault suggests to us that to work with

the simple opposition between reason and unreason, or with
the notion of a bifurcation of reason into emancipatory and
technical-strategical, is unhelpful.

On the one hand,

relying on the dichotomy "reason versus unreason" forces us
to say either that the disciplinary institution and its
justification is based on reason or that it is based on
unreason.

In the first case, we place ourselves outside of

rationality and thus on the side of irrationality.

In the

second case, we fail to realize the reasoning underlying
the institution, and thus underestimate its specific
rationality and effectiveness.
As Foucault's analysis of the human sciences shows,
then, we teachers and educators, in a regime of truth
called education, or more specifically curriculum, should
examine, as is described in 3.1., the basis on which historically contingent - principles of reasoning, or which
local frameworks certain strategies of control and
punishment are rationally defensible.

To paraphrase

Lyotard, we should focus on the particular and local rules
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on the basis of which we educators, teachers and students
are playing our language game at the present time.

A

language game called education is:
the instrument whereby every individual, in a society like our
own, can gain access to any kind of discourse.
But we well know
that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it
prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle-lines of social
conflict.
Every educational system is a political means of
maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with
the knowledge and the powers it carries with it. (Foucault,
1371, p. 227}

"Discipline" as a form of knowledge on which teachers'
so-called "professionalization" is based also limits and
controls our knowledge (1971, pp. 222-224/ Sheridan, 1980,
p. 126).

It constitutes an anonymous system that is

available to anyone who wishes to use i t : it is a corpus of
propositions regarded as true, a set of rules and
definitions, techniques and instruments.

A discipline is

what makes new statements, new propositions possible.

But

it is not simply all that may be said to be true about
something.

For every discipline is made up of errors as

well as truths, and these errors are not merely foreign
bodies to be ejected in time from the organism of the
discipline, but have often played an active, necessary part
in history.

For a proposition to belong to a particular

discipline, it must refer to a specific range of objects,
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which, however, changes from one period to another.

To

belong to a discipline, a proposition must also refer to a
certain body of theory.

The discipline is, thus, a

principle of control in the production of discourse.

It

fixes limits through an identity that takes the form of a
permanent reactivation of rules.
The teacher who is professionalized in at least one
discipline or form of knowledge unconsciously, or
consciously,

"excludes" knowledge and discourses that do

not conform to the established rules of his or her own
language game.

The teacher usually does not realize the

local, arbitrary, contingent, and transient character of
the rules with which s/he is playing his or her language
game.

New propositions, statements, and rules of the

discipline or the language game which are different from
those of his or her own professionalized discipline are not
allowed.

As Foucault points out properly (1983, p. 216),

however, the professionalization or individualization is
one of the technologies of the power-knowledge relation,
along with totalization, to produce docile bodies.

Thus,

as Labaree (1992) interprets Foucault (pp. 128-129), the
process of teacher professionalization is also seen to be a
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symptom of growing disciplinary power.

Foucault himself is

pretty clear about this:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as
they are free.
By this we mean individual or collective
subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which
several ways of behaving,
several reactions
and diverse
comportments may be realized.
where the determining factors
saturate the whole there is no relationship of power; slavery is
not a power relationship when man is in chains.

(1983, p. 221)

At the very moment teachers think they are subjects free
from power and have professionality in a localized
curriculum policy, they are prisoners of totalizing power
called disciplines and are committing a terror of excluding
dissents, combining Foucauldian and Lyotardian terminology.
Labaree (1992) analyzes the illusionary character of
teacher professionality in power relations of the recent
effort to professionalize (though not "localize") teachers
in the United States supported by the Carnegie Foundation
and the Holmes Group, and maintains that the effort is to
raise teacher educators' status (in power relations), not
teachers' own.
Although McLaren (1994) says, regarding this, invoking
Lyotard, "few criticalists in education still ascribe to
the notion of freestanding autonomous subject self
fashioned through free will and good intentions" and
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"subjectivity is now recognized as bearing a constitutive
relationship to social power and the relationships to which
it gives rise" (p. 322), it is very doubtful that this
remark is appreciated by all "criticalists" and
professionalized teachers.
Admitting that the Foucauldian concept of "discipline"
is not directly concerned with academic disciplines as
forms of knowledge, Giroux borrows the Foucauldian concept
to explain arbitrariness of an academic discipline which is
the essential part of teachers' professionality:
what is studied under the aegis of an academic discipline at any
given time is not natural subject matter, but a field which is
itself constituted by the practice of the discipline.
Such a
field is not arbitrary in the sense that it develops randomly or
on whim; rather, a field can be called arbitrary because it is
contingent on historical circumstance.
Hence it reflects
cultural, social, and institutional demands. (1988, p. 145)

While acknowledging their stability in the short run,
Cherryholmes (1988) also holds that, agreeing to Foucault's
argument that power makes truth possible, "transcendental
signifieds for academic discipline are in the long run
fictional"

(p. 148) .

It was an accident of history with no

single author, according to him (Cherryholmes, 1988, p.
139), that disciplinary structure became a transcendental
signified for curriculum.

Once it was in place, it
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determined who could speak and what could be said.

Hence,

curricularists and teachers are not in control of their
discourse; quite the reverse, dominant discursive practices
dictated who is a curricularist and a teacher.
The most visible and official form of these dominant
discursive practices in the actual classroom is, of course,
the textbook.

So-called "legitimate" knowledge is made

available in schools through the textbook.

Apple (1989;

1986) is one among those who analyze the ideological and
political character of the school textbook.

According to

him (1989, pp. 156-157), the curriculum in most American
schools is not defined by courses of study or suggested
programmes, but by one particular artifact, the
standardized, grade-level-specific text in mathematics,
reading, social studies, science and so on.

The impact of

this on the social relations of the classroom is also
immense.

Apple estimates that 75 per cent of the time that

elementary and secondary students are in classrooms and 90
per cent of the time that they are doing homework is spent
with text materials.

This

phenomenon is more conspicuous

in Korea where all the textbooks are published or censored
by the central government, teaching outside the content of
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the textbook is prohibited as a general rule, and textbooks
are (mis)identified with curriculum (2.2. in this study).
In England also, the textbook is regarded as "a composite
cultural commodity which provides an authoritative
pedagogic version of received knowledge," and textbooks are
"not just imposed on pupils by teachers, but imposed first
on teachers by their employers or by the state"

(Stray,

1994, p. 4).
While Olson (1989) sees the source of the authority of
textbooks being from "the divorce of the speaker from his
utterance" (p. 233), Luke and others (1989) argue that the
authority of textbooks comes mainly from the historical,
social, or institutional contexts in which those texts are
owned, taught, and studied (pp. 245-260).

According to

them, textbooks have authority because the social
institutions authorize them.

Drawing on Foucauldian view

of knowledge and post-New Criticism literary theory, they
argue that knowledge is not, nor could it be, "in the text"
solus and that the background knowledge of the reader and
the social situation of the act of reading determine the
meaning, interpretation and criticism of the text.
other words, there is no fixed meaning in text.

In

Thus, "the
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text is rewritten with each reading"
Luke, 1989, p. 249).

(Luke, de Castell, and

This interpretation of authorship is

in exact accord with Foucault's refusal "to maintain the
sovereign function of the author with respect to his own
texts"

(Morris and Patton, 1979, p. 115).

Regarding his

own texts, Foucault says:
A book is made to be used in ways not defined by its writer.
The more new, possible or unexpected uses there are, the happier
1 shall be.

(Morris and Patton, 1979, p. 115)

Like this, Foucault decenters authority of a text from the
author to the reader.

The Foucauldian concept of author as

the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or
statements, which is one of procedures limiting and
controlling discourse (Foucault, 1971, pp. 221-222), is
correspondent to the Lyotardian concept of metanarrator who
seeks legitimation of his or her own metanarrative by doing
violence to the heterogeneity of the language game, and
thus by prohibiting local determination of the validity and
the rules of the game.
Unlike ordinary texts, school textbooks always
presuppose an existence of an arbiter called teacher.
and others describe the relation among the text, the

Luke
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teacher, and the students as following, which shows what
Foucault would call anonymity of the author's power:
The school text is always the object of teacher mediation.
One
instructs with and through the text; a student confronts textual
knowledge via teacher mediation.
In classroom situation the
text is the locus of information exchange.
Inasmuch as the text
for a particular subject, theme, or topic constrains the content
of classroom information exchange, so does the teacher mediate
the exchange between student and t e x t .
And within this
communicational system of the classroom, a system supporting a
particular structure of information exchange,
the student
assumes acquiescent, non-authoritative status in relation to
both the text and the reader.
(Luke, de Castell, and Luke,
1989, p. 252)

Thus for students, the text stands as an iconic marker of
authority, both a symbol and an agent of institutional
power and the teacher becomes a "surrogate author"
de Castell, and Luke, 1989, p. 257).

(Luke,

This authority might

be what most debates for decentralization or localization
of curriculum seek for under the name of teacher autonomy,
as we have seen in the last chapter.

However, according to

Foucault, this teacher authority or autonomy in (localized)
classrooms is only "pseudo-sovereign"

(1977, p. 222), and

"the man described for us whom we are invited to free, is
already in himself the effect of a subjection much more
profound than himself" (1979a, p. 30) .
Again, as far as the teacher assumes the status of a
surrogate author or a metanarrator, which seems to have
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been an important part of a localized curriculum policy or
teacher professionalization, s/he is committing a violence
in Foucauldian terms and committing a terror in Lyotardian
terms to his or her students.

The way the teacher can

escape from committing this terror or violence and from an
illusion of professionality and individuality seems to be,
paradoxically, deprofessionalization of him- or herself, in
the sense that s/he can be really free from totalizing
power and from metanarrative only through what Pignatelli
(1993) calls "self-detachment"

(p. 417).

Self-detachment

is an abandonment of Voltaire-like attitude and an
insurrection of local, low-ranking, or subjugated knowledge
(Foucault, 1980, pp. 81-83), namely local struggle by the
local intellectual.
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to
refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we
could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind,"
which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of
m o d e m power structures. (Foucault, 1983, p. 216)

From a political view, this self-detachment from his or her
discipline or professionalization could lead to "an
undermining of the hope to discover or create a true theory
or an accurate description of a just society"

(Beyer and

Liston, 1992, p. 374), but could open "the way for a

broader, less privileged, and more public contest about
what is valued and who gets heard"
422).

(Pignatelli, 1993, p.

Instead of Pignatelli's self-detachment, Kiziltan

and others (1990) pick up the term limit-attitude as a
strategy of Foucauldian (local) struggle, which Foucault
uses in his "What is Enlightenment?"

(1984) and which is

not very different from self-detachment.

The end of this

limit-attitude is "to separate out from the contingency
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer
being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, think"
(Foucault, 1984, p. 170; Kiziltan, Bain, and Canizares M . ,
1990, p. 364).
"The use of paralogy"

(Fritzman, 1990; Kiziltan, Bain,

and Canizares M., 1990), which is often considered as
Lyotardian strategy for "a war on totality"

(Lyotard, 1984,

p. 82), is very similar to the Foucauldian strategy for
local struggle.

It is to respect the little narrative

[petit reci-t] and to generate other statements and other
game rules.

It is to produce not the known, but the

unknown and to search dissension, not consensus, by
activating the differences.

It is to present the
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unpresentable and to use imagination, which allows one
either to make a new move or change the rule of the game.
When .a teacher deprofessionalizes him- or herself,
s/he can realize, and hence resist the power of regime of
truth, whether it is individualizing or totalizing,
centralized or decentralized to the state.

S/he can

recognize the nature of recurring games or regimes of truth
by revaluing the local, subjugated, oppressed, other,
different knowledge.

What the teacher should deal with is

not whether something is true or false but determination of
the distinction between true and false and of the criteria
for what is admitted for consideration as true or false
(Kiziltan, Bain, and Canizares M., 1990, p. 359).
However, this deprofessionalization, self-detachment,
limit-attitude, or use of paralogy never means trivializing
or abrogating teachers' identity and role in the classroom
as much as Foucauldian and Lyotardian anti-humanism does
not mean the death of humanity at all.

Rather, as Doll

(1993) indicates, it seeks for local decisions involving
students, teachers, and local mores and traditions instead
of deus ex machina type control and authority (p. 167) .
Moreover, it is never an easy task for a teacher to abandon

his or her privileged authority and alleged autonomy within
a professionalized discipline, to stress and promote
"dissimilarity, constant decentering, endless deferral, and
recurring doubt," and to impel "the multiplicity and
fluidity of the self, knowledge, and the world"
Bain, and Canizares M., 1990, p. 366).

(Kiziltan,

It is many times

more arduous and perplexing than enj oying one's
individuality and professionality in a closed system of
knowledge.

It should be an ordeal and a challenge,

ontological and epistemological, to a teacher.

CHAPTER FOUR
DIALOGUE AS A PRACTICE OF LOCAL CURRICULUM

4.1. Dialogue and Contemporary Educational Theory
If the teacher appreciates the arbitrariness of
disciplines and deprofessionalizes him- or herself, the
concept of professional autonomy also has to be changed.
Autonomy can no longer be interpreted as an audacious and
privileged superimposition of disciplinary (in both senses
of the word) knowledge upon students nor as the Cartesian
subjectivity of knowledge nor as the Habermasian agent of
Enlightenment.

It is an autonomy as a generator, not a

regulator, of new rules and statements and as an analyzer
of regime of truth by delegitimatizing willingly one's own
specialities.

The teacher is no more than a player of

language game(s) and has to tolerate and respect other
moves of the game(s).
The importance of this self-detachment, limitattitude, or imagination is not exclusively focused on by
so-called "post-" philosophers such as Foucault and
Lyotard.

Pinar (1980; 1988a; 1988b; 1994) also raises

questions about a stable, authentic self.
113

For him, self is
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what we create, or construct (or deconstruct) , as we read,
write, speak and listen.

It is "always in motion and in

time, defined in part by where it is not, when it is not,
what it is not" (1994, p. 220).

Although he does not

explicitly endorse "post-" philosophies, Pinar's concept of
autobiography is affinitive to Foucault's concept of
genealogy as counter-memory or as search for descent, thus
suggesting more specific ways of applying the concept of
local curriculum developed so far in this study.

As

genealogy disturbs what was previously considered immobile
and fragments what was thought unified, autobiography "can
serve as a method for enlarging, occupying and building the
space of mediation," and it "enlarges the space by pushing
back the edges of memory, disclosing more of what has been
forgotten, suppressed and denied" (1994, p. 217) .
Moreover, Pinar's call for (the curriculum theorist's)
continual willingness "to give oneself up, including one's
point of view (in dialectic movement)"

(1994, p. 119) is in

perfect accord with the Foucauldian strategy of local
struggle: self-detachment or limit attitude.

His concept

of currere represents a call for the cultivation of such an
internal dialectic.

"It is a call to examine one's
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response to a text, a response to an idea, response to a
colleague, in ways which invite depth understanding and
transformation of that response"

(Pinar, 1994, p. 119).

The following passage resonates Foucault's antagonism
against universal intellectuals and Lyotard's rejection of
metanarrative, too:
A few scholars and theorists lay claim to timeless truths, and
having completed the task of their own salvation - intellectual
not spiritual in this secular age - they devote themselves to
the conversion of others.

(Pinar, 1980; 1994, p. 119)

He defines the relation between students and curriculum as
a "dialogical encounter"

(1994, p. 126) between the knower

and the known in which social and intellectual situations
are dialectically transformed, although his autobiography
also includes dialogue between self-self and

self-other,

as well as dialogue between self-object.
Pinar's early emphasis on this dialogical nature of
curriculum theory and classroom activities, on the fluidity
of self and knowledge, and on differences seems to have
presaged the later influences of the French philosophers on
curriculum and education.

Recently, albeit in various

contexts, the concept of dialogue has been combined with
the postmodern concept of difference and further developed
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by some curriculum theorists (for example, Burbules, 1993;
Bowers and Flinders, 1990; Ellsworth, 1989; Burbules and
Rice, 1991; Noddings, 1986; Shor, 1992; Shor and Freire,
1987; Giroux, 1988), most of whose arguments are placed in
the tradition of Freire's "critical pedagogy" and invoke
so-called "post-" theories to a certain extent.
As is widely known, one of the central concepts of
Freire's critical pedagogy is dialogue, along with
liberation, reflection, real consciousness, problem-posing,
oppression, etc.

The goals of critical pedagogy are

expressed as a critical democracy (or "radical democracy,"
Giroux, 1988, p. 75), individual freedom, social justice,
and social transformation -- a revitalized public sphere
characterized by citizens capable of cultural action for
freedom and against domination "inside and outside a
classroom where the status quo is challenged, where the
myths of the official curriculum and mass culture are
illuminated"

(Shor and Freire, 1987, p. 12).

Dialogue is

an important form of praxis to transform the world in
critical pedagogy.

It is even an "existential necessity"

(Freire, 1970, p. 69) because people transform the world by
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naming it, speaking their world, and thus achieve
significance as human beings.
Dialogue does not exist in a politica.1 vacuum...To achieve a
goal
of
transformation,
dialogue
implies
responsibility,
directiveness, determination, discipline, objectives...Dialogue
means a permanent tension in the relation between authority and
liberty. But in this tension, authority continues to be because
it has authority vis-a-vis permitting student freedoms which
emerge, which grow and mature precisely because authority and
freedom learn self-discipline. (Shor and Freire, 1987, p. 16)

In critical pedagogy, dialogic method is proposed as
"empowering the disadvantaged"

(Shor, 1992, p. 105} and

ultimately transforming unequal society by putting limits
on the teacher's dominating voice and calling on the
students to codevelop a joint learning process.

Thus, the

critical pedagogy regards the concept of dialogue as an
opportunity for the oppressed to express their subjugated
voices.

As can be noticed in Burbules's works (1993;

Burbules and Rice, 1991) , dialogue is suggested by some
"critical theorists" as an important means to bridge the
gap between its traditional (or modern) liberatory
discourses and the postmodernist concepts of difference and
locality.

Consequently, their concept of dialogue can not

help putting an emphasis on similarity as well as
differences.

The similarities would be, naturally, those

of oppression, pain, and alienated feelings.

In "post-"
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theories, they would argue, a politics that highlights
different struggles with similar intent is missing (Kanpol,
1992, p. 42).

Giroux (1990) also points out that what is

sorely lacking in postmodern educational literature is
attention to both a theory and politics of similarity
within difference and a politics of democracy, difference
and cultural struggle (p. 6).
This concept of dialogue is epitomized in a recently
published book {Burbules, 1993).

Although he uses such

postmodernist concepts as difference and
incommensurability, Burbules (1993; Burbules and Rice,
1991) places much importance on sameness in the concept of
dialogue.

He argues, "any concrete discussion of

difference also implies sameness: two objects, two people,
two points of view, and so on can be contrasted usefully
only when there are at least some respects on which they
are similar"

(Burbules and Rice, 1991, p. 403).

He

distinguishes two varieties of postmodernism: postmodernism
per se and antimodernism.

He illustrates the work of

Giroux and McLaren as postmodernist and prizes the work as
an attempt to reappropriate and expand modernist concepts
such as democracy, liberty, rights, citizenship, and so
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forth to the postmodernist terrain.

He defines

antimodernist position as being characterized by a strong
antipathy to the languages, issues, and values of
modernism, and seeks to formulate an entirely different
problematic.

Hence it is not concerned with recapturing

and reformulating modern values, such as reason and
equality, according to him, but with deconstructing them
and rejecting them.

He further argues:

Having
deconstructed
all
metanarratives
and
radically
relativized all possible values, a n t i m o d e m i s m is left with no
clear way of justifying any alternatives.. .Antimodemism lacks
a clear conception of a "positive freedom" that identifies
social conditions in which freer thought and action are
possible; lacking this a n t i m o d e m i s m has not been able to
articulate a clear and defensible educational theory. (Burbules
and Rice, 1991, pp. 398-399)

Thus, his concept of dialogue is related to "a clear
conception of a positive freedom that identifies social
conditions in which freer thought and action are possible"
and heavily relies on the Habermasian communicative
competence from which he draws "general rules of
communication"

(1993, pp. 72-78) and on the Chomskian

linguistic competence or deep structure which he does not
directly mention.

As is widely known, Habermasian

communicative theory and Chomskian theory of deep/surface
structure presuppose the universal rationality which
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enables human beings to communicate with each other
"rationally" and, ultimately, reach consensus among
themselves and to make sense of other languages (or to make
those translatable).
Dialogue aims at the reconciliation of differences or the
formation of new common meanings... The ordinary experience of
translation across natural languages tells us that the usual
case is that effective common meanings can be established, and
that sufficient equivalences can be built over time so that
speakers of any two languages can achieve a significant degree
of
mutual
understanding
and
effective
coordination
of
action...our ways of thinking and speaking about our world also
exhibit striking commonalities. (Burbules and Rice, 1991, p.
408)

Burbules1s goal of dialogue is in exact line with that of
Giroux whose theory he strongly supports: "all voices and
their differences become unified both in their efforts to
identify and recall moments of human suffering and in their
attempts to overcome conditions that perpetuate such
suffering"

(Giroux, 1988, p. 72).

However, he ignores not merely the fact that a simple
word like "father" gains other meanings that the original
word did not have or loses some meanings that it originally
had when it is translated into another natural language.
He also overlooks the fact that consensus or common meaning
is, if it is possible, as Lyotard indicates(1988), only "a
particular state of discussion" (pp. 65-66) and thus

contingent and subject to be deconstructed and disseminated
at the very moment the common meaning or consensus is
constructed.

Moreover, rules of a language game are not

the kind that could be pre-set but should be locally
determined by the players.

Rules of dialogue also can not

be prescribed as Burbules tries to do, but determined by
the players of the game of dialogue because, as Bowers and
Flinders indicate, "dialogue is a locally managed approach
to interaction"

(1990, p. 149).

Generally speaking,

dialogue in critical pedagogy, as well as Burbules's, is
not based on Foucauldian self-detachment or Pinar's "giving
oneself up."
Ellsworth (1989), whom Burbules describes and
criticizes as antimodernist, also is critical of these
pre-set goals and rules of classroom dialogue.

She,

quoting Aronowitz, argues that the critical pedagogue is
one who enforces the rules of reason in the classroom -- "a
series of rules of thought that any ideal rational person
might adopt if his/her purpose was to achieve propositions
of universal validity"

(Ellsworth, 1989, p. 304).

Under

these conditions and given the coded nature of the
political agenda of critical pedagogy, only one political
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gesture appears to be available to the critical pedagogue.
S/he can ensure that students are given the chance to
arrive logically at the "universally valid position"
underlying the discourse of critical pedagogy -- namely,
that all people have a right to freedom from oppression
guaranteed by the democratic social contract, and that in
the classroom, this proposition be given equal time vis-avis other sufficiently articulated and reasonably distinct
moral positions.

Consequently, for Ellsworth:

Dialogue in its conventional sense is impossible in the culture
at large because at this historical moment, power relations
between raced, classed, and gendered students and teachers are
unjust...conventional notions of dialogue and democracy assumes
rationalized, individualized subjects capable of being fully
rational and disinterested...fundamental moral and political
principles are not absolute and universalizable, waiting to be
discovered by the disinterested researcher/teacher. (Ellsworth,
1989, p. 316)

Burbules tries to escape the weakness that Ellsworth
attributes to critical pedagogy and its concept of dialogue
by emphasizing repeatedly mutual respect, tolerance of
diversity, difference, open-endedness, and so on.

However,

his attempt to establish a "non-teleological" concept of
dialogue does not seem to be successful because he refuses
to abandon universal rationality and the possibility of
common meaning or consensus as a basis of dialogue, which
makes his standpoint somewhat ambiguous and sometimes

123
equivocal.

To paraphrase Bakhtin, Burbules, as well as

other critical pedagogists, tries to establish as much
predictability as possible, and so to constitute, to some
extent a "centripetal," unifying or totalizing force
(Emerson and Morson, 1987, p. 46) while trying to admit a
fragmenting, centrifugal pull.

His own "pragmatic

approach" to dialogue has a danger of replacing differences
with "rational persuasion"

(1993, p. 164, his citation from

Bernstein), if not terror or violence.
Thus, the concept of dialogue in most of the
contemporary educational theory is not adequate for
classroom practice in a context of local curriculum that
this study has developed.

In Korea where the content of

curriculum is prescribed by the central government and
teachers are "professionalized" according to the fields in
the curriculum, this "rational" dialogue tends to be easily
used as a means of accomodationg students to the present
regime of truth and delivering fixed meanings provided by
the form of a textbook.
Besides the inadequacies explored so far, the concept
of dialogue in most of the contemporary theories of
education and curriculum reveals another limit.

It deals
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mainly with dialogue between, in Pinar's terms, self-other.
The concept of dialogue does not consider dialogue between,
again in Pinar's terms, self-self and self-object except
that Freire (1970) mentions a bit about the possibility of
expanding the concept of dialogical landscape to the
relation between self-object.
4.2. Bakhtinian Dialogism
In written speech, lacking situational and expressive supports,
communication must be achieved only through words and their
combinations;
this requires the speech activity to take
complicated forms -- hence the use of first drafts.
The
evolution from the draft to the final copy reflects our mental
process.
Planning has an important part in written speech, even
when we do not actually write out a draft.
Usually we say to
ourselves what we are going to write; this is also a draft,
though in thought only. (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 144)

Vygotsky's emphasis on the dialogic character of inner
speech like the quotation above is known as an influence of
Mikhail Bakhtin (Matejka, 1986, pp. 171-172) who argues
that every discourse refers to at least two subjects and
thus to a potential dialogue between them (Todorov, 1984,
p. 62).

Bakhtin calls this "the phenomenon of internal

dialogization"

(Bakhtin, 1981).

Thus, monologue is

dialogic, too.
Bakhtin's dialogue is roughly divided into two kinds.
One is dialogue between discourse and the generalized Other
which can be seen in his early writings; and the other is
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dialogue between discourses themselves, emphasized in his
later writings.

Kristeva's term of "intertextuality" is

used to introduce the later concept of dialogue (Todorov,
1984, p. 60).
The very being of man (both internal and external) is a profound
communication.
To be means to communicate...To be means to be
for the other, and through him, for oneself.
Man has no
internal sovereign territory; he is all and always on the
boundary; looking within himself, he looks in the eyes of the
other or through the eyes of the other. . .Life is dialogical by
its very nature.
To live means to engage in dialogue, to
question, to listen, to answer, to agree, etc. (Todorov, 1984,
pp. 96-97)

For Bakhtin, the present discourse is recognized as a
representation of a world view and the absent discourse
another, and dialogue is constructed between these two
different representations of world views.

Meaning of a

word is no exception:
The word is b o m in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it;
the word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word
that is already in the object.
A word forms a concept of its
own object in a dialogical way.
But this does not exhaust the
internal dialogism of the word. ..The word in living conversation
is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it
provokes an answer, anticipates an atmosphere of the already
spoken, the word is at the same tiime determined by that which
has not been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by
the answering the word.
Such is the situation in any living
dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 279-280)

All words have already been used and carry within
themselves the traces of preceding usage, and "things"
themselves have been touched, in at least one of their
previous states, by other discourses that one cannot fail
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to encounter.

Thus, for Bakhtin, the "actual meaning" of

an utterance "is understood against the background of other
concrete utterances on the same theme, a background made up
of contradictory opinions, points of view and value
judgements"

(1981, p. 281).

the universal, absolute one.

However, this meaning is never
It is a conditional meaning

acquired in a situation where one meaning and (an)other
dialogue with one another.

It is a product of a

negotiation which is a part of the process where meaning is
continuously recreated in a specific space and time.

There

is no fixed, universal meaning because meaning is locally
determined in an interaction between all possible meanings.
There is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which
have the potential of conditioning others.
Which will affect
the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is
actually settled at the moment of utterance...There can be no
actual monologue. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 426)

Bakhtin calls this process of creation and recreation
of conditional meaning "refraction" (1981, pp. 299-300).
When a reader reads a text, he can trace the "angle of
refraction" of authorial discourse as it passes through
various other voices, or voice- and character-zones.

But

there are other refracting media as well, including that
mass of alien words present not in the object but in the

127
consciousness of the reader (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 432) .
Bakhtin calls the base condition governing the operation of
meaning "heteroglossia" (p. 263).
It is that which insures the primacy of context over text.
At
any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of
conditions — social, historical, meteorological, physiological
-- that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at
that time will have a meaning different than it would have under
any other conditions. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 428)

Heteroglossia is a situation where new meanings, new
language games, and new rules are generated, the situation
of a subject surrounded by the myriad responses he or she
might make at any particular point.

It is a way of

conceiving

the world as made up of a roiling mass of

languages,

each of which has its own distinct formal

markers.

As Holquist interprets it (1990), heteroglossia

assumes that such contingent details as differences in the
weather or

in the physical condition of the speakers are

reflected in utterance and have an effect on the way formal
linguistic features can convey meaning (pp. 69-70) .
Thus, as Maranhao summarizes (1990, p. 3), Bakhtin
explains dialogues between self - (other)self, self-other,
and self-object, as mutually constituting.

The subject's

"conceptual horizon" represents the circle of one's vision,
that is, the refractions imposed upon reality and at the
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same time constitutive of reality from the point of view of
a self addressing an other.
Emerson and Morson {1987) name several terminologies
which are foundations of Bakhtin's dialogism:
unfinalizability, war on system, dissolving oppositions,
polyphony, chronotopes and anachronism, and carnival, all
of which correspond to Foucauldian and Lyotardian concepts
of locality.

"Unfinalizability" is used to imply the human

tendency to defy all that purports to be fixed and stable.
"Man [sic] is not a final and defined quantity upon which
firm calculations can be made"
p. 44).

(Emerson and Morson, 1987,

Humans always have a tendency to dialogue with

others, seeking new, open meanings.

For Bakhtin, universal

system is the antithesis of human freedom.

The very notion

of system suggests "finalizability" in which desire for
dialogue is suppressed and new meanings are shut up,
whereas he views the world as an interaction of systemic
and nonsystemic elements, each of which merges and emerges
in largely unpredictable and contingent patterns.
Bakhtin's rejection of Saussurian (or Jakobson’s) binary
oppositions can be well seen in the following quotation:
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My attitude toward Structuralism: I am against enclosure in a
text.
Mechanical categories:
“opposition,"
"changing in
codes"...But I hear voices in everything {as quoted in Emerson
and Morson, 1987, p. 47)

Symmetrical opposition between langue-parole, signifiedsignifier, society-individual, and other-self in Saussurian
linguistics is dissolved and replaced with difference and
simultaneity by Bakhtinian dialogue because the concept of
dialogue is based upon the "inner duality" of each
opposition.

"Polyphony," which implies that many

unfinalizable voices are heard at the same time, uttering
the same word differently, and "chronotope," which Bakhtin
coined to indicate differences of people and their
utterances and thoughts conditioned by space and time,
both stand against Habermasian universal rationality,
sameness, telos, and all kinds of determinism.

"Carnival"

is the name Bakhtin gave to the spirit of creative
destruction, to revivifying parody.

It is similar to

Foucauldian genealogy and Lyotardian paralogy.
Carnival... is a means for displaying otherness: carnival makes
familiar relations strange... Carnival is both the name of a
specific
kind
of
historically
instanced
thing...and
an
immaterial
force
which
such
particular
instances
characteristically embody. {Holquist, 1990, p. 89)

Carnival represents the denial of supposedly eternal
truths, asserting that there are no eternal truths.

It
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parodies the official norms synecdochically and preaches
the "joyous relativity" of all things.

Carnival is the

world of dialogue where contradictions are blessed.
As Daelemans and Maranhao interpret Bakhtin (Daelemans
and Maranhao, 1990, p. 232), any given language is a
congeries of languages.

Every utterance is an additional

decentering of something already said.

The utterance in a

dialogic turn taking receives an author who becomes
identified as "the creator of the utterance"

(Todorov,

1984, p. 61); in the speech situation the utterance is the
"face" of the speaker.

Nevertheless, the utterance is far

from exhausting the uniqueness and individuality of its
author.

In a way, every utterance creates its author, but

for Bakhtin, man cannot be reduced to the statements s/he
utters.

The utterance only identifies its author in the

absence of a correlative utterance expressing an
alternative world view.

Consequently, to speak means to

enter the realm of endless dialogue about the world.
4.3. Dialogue in the Classroom
When asked the question "What does chrysanthemum
connote in the poem By Chrysanthemum?," all high-school
students and graduates in Korea reply immediately,

"A

beauty of maturity!"

That would very likely be their

answer if they have been "normally" attending the Korean
Language and Literature class.

They are taught so.

It

does not matter whether a student was touched by white
chrysanthemums at a solemn funeral from which s/he has just
returned or has just received the flower from a friend.
There is no place for Bakhtinian heteroglossia and
dialogue, nor phenomenological pre-understanding.
Differences among students are totally ignored by the pre
defined meaning of the word.

Only one fixed rule of the

language game governs the classroom, and any other rules or
new language games are not allowed.

No matter who decides

the meaning of curriculum and textbooks -- the government,
the author, or a specialized art critic or literary critic
-- the meaning cannot be "refracted" against other
meanings.

Students' "other" utterances, inner or outward,

are superseded by standardized and objective answers and
are forced to remain a monologue.
Competitive college entrance examinations instigate
and worsen the situation.

Teacher-proof curricular

materials are promoted so that any dialogue, between
teacher-self, teacher-other teachers, teacher-student,

teacher-texts, student-self, student-other students, and
student-texts, is impossible.

Teacher-proof materials

suppress all possible voices emanating from dialogue other
than the one the present regime of truth can allow.
Teacher-proof materials turn the teacher into a technician
whose major function is to implement someone else's
teaching methods and materials, and thus turns one's own
voice into someone else1s .

This monologic method of

teaching might have contributed to the Korean students'
high scores on standardized achievement tests which demand
only one correct answer to a question.

However, unlike

what some critics argue (Epstein, 1992; Center for the
Assessment of Educational Progress, 1989; National
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), scores on
standardized tests cannot be identified with the "quality
of education."

Those high scores are accomplished by

reinforcing the teacher, through the process of
professionalization, specialization, or individualization,
to play a universal author or transcendental metanarrator,
and at the price of differences, heteroglossia, and
dissents.

These are the result of a highly centralized

curriculum policy in which only pre-set objectives can be
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achieved, as was shown in chapters 2 and 3 of this study.
This former policy can not be bettered by just espousing
local curriculum policy, especially in Korea where all the
contents of curriculum and the methods of instruction are
prescribed virtually by the central government.
Under the circumstances where one fixed meaning of a
text is anticipated, no matter whether it is centralized
curriculum policy or localized one, no dialogue is
possible.

If it were possible, it would be the one that

aims at consensus or "rational persuasion," not at the
generation of new meanings, new rules, and new language
games.

A capable teacher is the one who can accept and

provide all possible, not anticipated, meanings of a text
and, thus, one Lyotard would call "imaginative."

As

Gadamer says (1979, p. 216), the belief that one fixed
objective meaning can be obtained is an illusion.

Meaning

occurs at the diachronic and synchronic intersection of
dialogue.

It is unfinalizable, never ceasing to dialogue

with other meanings.
Curriculum, centralized or localized, is implemented
and realized by the teacher.

Even under an alleged

localized curriculum, classroom practices can never be
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localized if the teacher is just satisfied with just his or
her professionalized disciplinary knowledge and tries only
to deliver a prescribed set of knowledge.

Such practices,

though, would be a much easier job than questioning and
deconstructing continuously, both his or her identity and
knowledge.
Once again, dialogue in a classroom is possible only
when the teacher appreciates the historical contingency of
one's own disciplinary knowledge in power-knowledge
relations.

It is the teacher's self-detachment, limit-

attitude, imagination, use of paralogy, giving oneself up,
and deprofessionalization that is needed in the Bakhtinian
concept of dialogue.
In the end, localizing curriculum is not a matter of
transferring the power of "selecting" curriculum content
from the central government to the locale.

It is

localizing the teacher's identity and knowledge, which is
possible only by realizing the dialogic nature of identity
and knowledge.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study aims at suggesting that curriculum
localization cannot be achieved by mere change in
curriculum policy.

Because the actual implementer of the

curriculum is the teacher, any curriculum policy cannot be
localized unless classroom practice is localized.

From a

Foucauldian point of view, power is no longer centered only
around the State.

The school and the classroom where

knowledge is developed, refined and transmitted to students
are basically "disciplinary" institutions to produce docile
bodies.

The teacher cannot escape from the regime of truth

and becomes a docile body unless s/he struggles against the
regime.

However, this struggle against power-knowledge

relations is never easy because we have little control over
an anonymous and powerful discourse that is a product of
power-knowledge relations.

The anonymous and powerful

discourse not only is used by power, unlike what most of
the Marxist critics argue, but also produces power which is
multiple and ubiquitous.

This study shows that the

multiple and ubiquitous form of power in schools and
135
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classrooms is the teacher's professionalized and
specialized knowledge.

As long as s/he remains in, and is

satisfied with his disciplinary knowledge, the teacher
produces bodies docile to the regime of truth and is
personally a docile body.
The struggle should be local by the local
intellectual.

The struggle for the local curriculum should

be local in the classroom by the local teacher.

It should

be against totalizing regime of truth of which the teacher
is already a part, that is his or her disciplinary
knowledge.

Foucault calls this local struggle "self-

detachment."
Lyotard's rejection of all kinds of grand theories is
also related to the concept of local curriculum in that he
delegitimates all-encompassing and totalizing knowledge,
defining it as terroristic.

For Lyotard, knowledge and

power are simply two sides of the same question: who
decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be
decided?

Classroom practice by which "knowledge" is a main

concern also is a field of representing power.

Thus,

playing only one language game by only one rule in the
classroom is terroristic, blocking possible heterogeneity
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and differences.

According to Lyotard, the character of

knowledge in this postmodern era consists in dissension,
not in consensus of opinion.

He sees all kinds of

knowledge, language games, and forms of life as locally
determined.

In the classroom, the validity of knowledge

should be judged only in a particular language game by the
players, including the teacher and students, here and now,
and is not transferrable to any other forms of knowledge or
language games.
Despite a promise to localize curriculum in the new
Korean National Curriculum, the teacher will be a prisoner
of totalizing power called disciplines and will commit the
terror of excluding dissensions as long as s/he thinks
him- or herself as a subject free from power and armed with
professional knowledge.

Especially under the condition

that most of the textbooks are published or approved by the
central government, the teacher's professional knowledge is
often identified with that of the textbook and of the
dominant regime of truth.

However, the textbook does not

hold the authority of transcendental signified any more.
There is no fixed meaning in the textbook, and the textbook
is rewritten with each reading.

Although, in Korea, there have been efforts of
teachers to struggle against the authority of the
prescribed knowledge in the textbook since 1989, most of
those efforts place emphasis on ideological struggles based
on political programs that are "emancipatory", rather than
on heterogeneity and differences of language games in the
classroom or on the local determination of knowledge.

This

is especially true of the book by the Teachers Association
for Korean Language and Literature {Teachers Association
for Korean Language and Literature, 1989a).

The writers of

the book urge teachers to cultivate "true consciousness"
among students by helping them understand their own
oppressive reality.

This emancipatory and liberatory telos

assumes a universal grand narrative and fails to recognize
and generate new rules of the language game in the
classroom other than the ones which teachers pre-decide to
be acceptable in order to "conscientize" their students.
Similar schemes are found in contemporary educational
discourses about dialogue which is suggested to bridge the
gap between the universal emancipatory theory of education
and differences in the classroom.

Similarity rather than

differences is emphasized in the concept of dialogue in the
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critical pedagogy of Freire, Giroux, and Shor, as well as
in Burbules's argument.

The rational human being who has

universal rationality for communication is presupposed in
the concept.
However, as Lyotard argues, consensus is a horizon
that is never reached.

Consensus or common meaning

deconstructs itself as soon as it is reached.

Bakhtin's

concept of dialogue, which is based on such concepts as
unfinalizability, death of the author, meaning as a
historical "event," intertextual construction of meaning,
heteroglossia, polyphony etc., could give us more pertinent
insight for dialogue which can manage the locality in the
classroom.
"Locality" in curriculum localization should be in
classrooms.

The content of curriculum should be ultimately

determined by the players of language games or dialogues in
the classroom.

Dialogue in the classroom should not

anticipate any consensus or common meaning rather than
differences and should aim at generating new rules and
language games.
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